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Since the Supreme Court's declaration in 1957 that obscenity is
not speech protected by the first amendment,' the Court has struggled with both substantive and procedural problems arising from federal and state attempts to regulate obscenity. 2 Other than briefly
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1 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). In that case, consolidated with
Alberts v. California, the Supreme Court for the first time faced the issue of whether
obscenity was protected speech. In question were the constitutionality of both a
California statute which made it a crime to possess obscene materials for the purpose of
sale and to advertise such materials in an obscene manner and also a federal statute
which made it a crime to send or advertise obscene matter in the mail. Id. at 479-84 &
nn.1-2. These cases were not only the Court's first confrontation with the constitutionality of obscenity laws, but they also marked the Court's first attempt to define obscenity.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, declared that there was no incompatibility
btween anti-obsc.n.
w, md the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press
because obscenity is in a class of "utterances" which historically have not been considered as falling within the protection of the first amendment. Id. at 484-85. It was
made clear, however, that sex and obscenity were not to be viewed as one and the
same, and that there was a wide range of materials in which the depiction of sex is
protected speech. Id. at 487. Ultimately, the test of obscenity that emerged was one that
had been used in a number of state and federal courts: "whether to the average person,
applying contemporary conmunity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Id. at 489 (footnote omitted).
2 Although there were sharp dissents, the Court in the ensuing years adhered to the
Roth test, discussed in note 1 supra, clarifying its meaning and defining the areas of its
application. For example, in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962), petitioners challenged a determination by the Judicial Officer of the Post Office Department that three different magazines geared to a homosexual audience were nonmailable
because they were obscene and because they contained advertisements that directed
readers to other sources of obscene materials. Id. at 479-81.
A majority of the Justices voted to reverse the determination of the Judicial Officer
but differed in their reasoning. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, grounded his
decision on an interpretation of Roth. He reasoned that, under Roth, there was not only
a requirement that " 'the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest' " but
also a further requirement that the material be "patently offensive." Id. at 482, 486 (quot-
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orienting the reader to the test for obscenity articulated by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California,3 this article will not deal with
the definitional problems in obscenity litigation, but will focus on
pre-hearing prior restraint issues. In addition, the article will examine the considerations in determining the relevant community
from which community standards are to be drawn, primarily as that
issue relates to the estoppel effect of judgments. Finally, it will
analyze the judgment-preclusion effect of a judgment of obscenity or
nonobscenity on a subsequent proceeding involving identical materials.
Prior restraint, community standards, and judgment preclusion
are issues that arise when the federal government or a state attempts
to regulate obscenity. In order to understand their significance fully,
it is necessary that one be familiar with the Burger Court's definition
of obscenity as rendered in Miller v. California.
In that case, the Court, retreating from the more liberal position
taken by the Warren Court in the 1960's, 4 returned to the premise
ing from Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (footnote omitted)). Justice
Harlan feared that, as in the case at hand, a failure to
require any determination as to the patent offensiveness vel non of the material
itself might well put the American public in jeopardy of being denied access to
many worthwhile works in literature, science, or art.
370 U.S. at 487. This fear was based on the fact that much great literature and art might
arguably be characterized as having a " 'dominant theme' " which appeals to " 'prurient
interest.' " Id. Yet, there was no doubt in his mind that Roth was a mandate "to tighten
obscenity standards" to prevent inroads on the free dissemination of such "worthwhile
works." Id. He thus concluded that Congress, in enacting the statute, did not intend to
exclude from the mails "material whose indecency [was not] self-demonstrating." Id. at
487-88.
Applying this rationale to the magazines in question, and using the entire nation as
the "relevant 'community' " in applying "community standards," Justice Harlan determined that the magazines could not, by "any permissible constitutional standard, be
deemed to be beyond the pale of contemporary notions of rudimentary decency." Id. at
488-89. Although the magazines lacked taste and were designed to appeal to the
"'prurient interest' " of homosexuals, the depictions of the male nudes were no more
offensive than similar depictions of female nudes not generally thought of as obscene.
Id. at 490.
3 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
4 In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), a movie censorship case, the Warren
Court reaffirmed the vitality of the Roth test and acknowledged the "patent offensiveness" requirement propounded by Justice Harlan in Manual. Jacobellis involved the
conviction of a theatre owner who had exhibited a film depicting the story of a woman
who, tired of her marriage, left her husband and her family for her lover. Id. at 193,
195-96. The state had objected primarily to an explicit love scene in the last reel. Id. at
196. There had also been advertising touting the scene as being " '[a]s close to authentic
amour as is possible on the screen' " and as " 'one of the longest and most sensuous
love scenes to be seen in this country.' " Id. at 201 n.2 (Warren, J., dissenting).
Reversing the conviction, the Court treated the obscenity issue at hand rather
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that obscenity is unprotected speech. 5 More specifically, the majority
fashioned a three-pronged test by which determinations of obscenity
are to be made. It was required that the trier of fact consider
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest; . . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
6
value.
routinely. The opinion, however, was significant in two respects. First, Justice Brennan
announced
that, in "obscenity" cases as in all others involving rights derived from the First
Amendment guarantees of free expression, this Court cannot avoid making an
independent constitutional judgment on the facts of the case as to whether the
material involved is constitutionally protected.
Id. at 190 (footnote omitted). Second, the Court determined that, in making such judgments in state obscenity actions, the nation was the relevant community from which
"community standards" would be ascertained and applied to the material. Id. at 192-95.
Persistent differences in how each Justice approached the problem of obscenity
remained; yet, the Warren Court could be characterized as slowly narrowing the definition of obscenity. This trend, however, was not totally consistent. See, e.g., Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966) (in borderline cases, evidence of pandering in
the sale of the materials may render the material obscene under the Roth test); Mishkin
v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966) (materials that are acknowledged to have prurient
appeal only to deviates can be found to be obscene).
Yet, at the same time that Ginzburg and Mishkin opened the door to prosecution of
a wider group of obscenity defendants, the Court sharply reduced the ability of prosecutors to win on the issue of obscenity vel non. In Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413 (!96)
the Co',,rt dealt with 1i Massa.husetts ban on John Cleland's two-century-old
novel, Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, also known as Fanny Hill. Id. at 415. In reversing the decision, the Court did not reach the issue of whether the material was
patently offensive or whether it appealed to prurient interest. Id. at 418-19. Rather,
Justice Brennan added a new element to the Roth test: In order to find material obscene, there must be a showing not only of appeal to prurient interest and patent offensiveness but also a showing that the material is totally lacking in "redeeming social
value." Id. at 418. Because the trial court had not required that the prosecution demonstrate that the novel totally lacked "redeeming social value," the decision was reversed.
Id. at 418-19. A comprehensive treatment of these cases may be found in Magrath, The
Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 7. For another case exemplifying
the liberal trend of the 1960's see Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
5 413 U.S. at 23. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
6 413 U.S. at 24 (quoting from Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, stated
that it was returning to the theory of Roth, distinguishing obscene expression from expression protected by the first amendment. 413 U.S. at 23-27. He characterized the existing test that had been formulated by the plurality of Justices in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), as a sharp departure from Roth. 413 U.S. at 21-22. He
noted the distinction between Roth's assumption that obscenity lacked social value
and Memoirs' "virtually impossible" burden on the prosecutor to prove it. Id. at 22.
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The Court, in laying down the test, stated that it is to be applied only
when (1) the offending "conduct [is] specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed," and (2) the
material "depicts or describes . .
sexual conduct."-7 Chief Justice
Burger summarized the effect of the decision as limiting obscenity
prosecutions to cases involving " 'hard core' " material which was devoid of "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 8
PRIOR RESTRAINTS

Although Miller has provided a working definition of obscenity
and has delineated a minimum level of patent offensiveness that must
be reached before materials-presumptively protected by the first
amendment-may be deemed obscene, 9 it is not only at the trial
stage that this test becomes operative. First amendment considerations pervade the entirety of an obscenity prosecution, whether criminal or civil, from the outset of the action to the final disposition of an
appeal. In particular, initial prosecutorial actions, such as search and
seizure and injunction against allegedly obscene materials, present
serious threats to first amendment rights because they may act as
prior restraints on expression.
In addition to search and seizure and injunction, some states
have enacted statutes which provide for nuisance actions against
property where obscenity is sold or exhibited. 10 Other states, as well
For discussions of Miller and its companion cases see Fahringer & Brown, The Rise
and Fall of Roth-A Critique of the Recent Supreme Court Obscenity Decisions, 62 Ky.
L.J. 731 (1974); Note, Community Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity Under
Miller v. California, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1838-60 (1975); The Supreme Court, 1972
Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 160-75 (1973); Comment, In Quest of a "Decent Society":
Obscenity and the Burger Court, 49 WASH. L. REV. 89 (1973).
7 413 U.S. at 24 (footnote omitted).
8 Id. at 26-27.
9 413 U.S. at 24-27. Since in Miller issues of prurient interest and patent offensiveness were deemed questions of fact, it was arguable that appellate review of trier of fact
determinations was sharply limited. Nonetheless, the Court, in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418
U.S. 153 (1974), declared that Miller had established minimum levels of patent offensiveness which had to be reached before materials could be deemed obscene and "that
juries [do not] have unbridled discretion in determining what is 'patently offensive.' "
Id. at 160-61. Here, the state's highest court had affirmed a jury determination that the
movie "Carnal Knowledge" was obscene. Id. at 154-55. The Supreme Court reversed,
relying on Miller for the propositions that only "hard core" materials could be suppressed and that such materials, at a minimum, would have to contain scenes of "ultimate sexual acts," lewd depictions of genitals or masturbation, and the like. Id. at 160.
Reviewing the film, the Court concluded that since none of the foregoing acts or depictions had occurred in the film, "Carnal Knowledge" could not constitutionally be
deemed obscene. Id. at 161.
10 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.01 et seq. (Page 1971).
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as the federal government, have entrusted administrative agencies
with the responsibility of regulating obscenity. 1 1 All of these procedures are subject to the Supreme Court's unequivocal declaration that
"[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression" has "a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. "12 Although prior restraints are
permissible under certain circumstances, the overwhelming thrust of
the Supreme Court's activity in this area is to limit sharply such restraints regardless of the manner in which they arise. Thus, whether
the restraint has resulted from a search or seizure, injunction, nuisance proceeding, or administrative action, the Court, in determining
the constitutionality of the procedure, has employed a functional
analysis-an examination of how the restraint operates, the scope of
the restraint, and the extent to which it may be more narrowly circumscribed.
For example, the Court, in Kingsley Books v. Brown, x3 upheld
the validity of a New York injunction procedure which permitted an
appropriate official to obtain an injunction halting the sale and distribution of allegedly obscene materials prior to trial of the issue of obscenity. 4 The Court pointed to the fact that the New York statute required a trial within one day of the joining of the issue and a decision
within two days of the trial.' 5 Examining the operation of the injunction procedure from a functional perspective, the Court concluded
that any prior restraints engendered by such a procedure were min-

imal. 16
In contrast, where the prior restraint is effective for more than a
short period of time, is directed at materials not listed on a warrant,
or is iinpliemented under a reduced judicial scrutiny, it will almost

11

See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 59-60 (1963); Illinois Citizens
Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
12Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
'3 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
14Id. at 437-38 & n.1, 445.
15Id. at 439.

16Id. at 441-45. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, described the functional
approach:
The judicial angle of vision in testing the validity of a statute . . . is "the
operation and effect of the statute in substance." . . . The phrase "prior restraint" is not a self-wielding sword. Nor can it serve as a talismanic test.
Id. at 441 (quoting from Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931)),
The Court's reliance on Near v.Minnesota was well founded. That case dealt with
the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute which placed prior restraints on periodicals
which regularly circulated defamatory matter. 283 U.S. at 700, 713. The Court concluded that the content of the periodical was irrelevant, that state libel laws were sufficient remedy, and thus that the prior restraint violated the fourteenth amendment. Id. at
715, 723.
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invariably be deemed unconstitutional. These restrictions on prior restraints were articulated by the Supreme Court in Marcus v. Search
Warrant'7 where under Missouri law a magistrate was permitted to
determine that materials were probably obscene merely upon an
affiant's conclusory statements and, upon such finding, to issue a
search and seizure warrant.' 8 The procedure was ex parte and provided no swift post-seizure disposition of the obscenity issue such as
there had been in Kingsley. 19 Further, in this particular case, there
20
had been a broad seizure of materials not specified on the warrant.
The state had argued that the Missouri procedures were similar
to the New York scheme upheld by the Court as constitutional in
Kingsley. 2 1 The Court rejected this argument, distinguishing the New
York procedure on a number of grounds. Unlike Missouri's procedure, New York's statute provided that a magistrate view the materials in question prior to issuing the injunction and only direct restraints, whether permanent or temporary, against named, specific
publications. 22 Moreover, the Court noted that since New York had
enjoined distribution rather than seize allegedly obscene materials,
distributors might "circulate the publication despite the interim re2 3
straint and then raise the claim of nonobscenity by way of defense."In contrast, Missouri's mass seizure precluded any pre-trial distribution unless the appellants obtained new materials. 2 4 The Marcus
Court thus reversed the appellants' conviction on fourteenth amendment due process grounds because the Missouri statute failed to provide the appellants a chance to refute the officer's conclusions prior to
the issuance of the warrant, and failed to provide guidelines by which
the police power could be more narrowly exercised so as to prevent
seizure of nonobscene matter.25
367 U.S. 717 (1961).
Id. at 718-19.
19 Id. at 720-21.
20 Id. at 723. Officers seized magazines not named in the warrant based upon their
own determination of obscenity. Further, they seized all copies of any magazines
deemed obscene. All told, 11,000 copies of various magazines were taken into custody.
Id.
21 Id. at 734.
22 Id. at 735. In the New York procedure, copies of the allegedly obscene materials
17
1I

were attached to the complaint. Id.
23 Id. at 735-36.
24 Id. at 736. Since the distributor would surreptitiously have to obtain other copies
of the materials seized by the police, the public would not be able to obtain copies
unless the distributor was willing to undergo the risks and was successful in avoiding
another police seizure of materials. Id.
25 Id. at 731-33.
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A statutory scheme providing for mass seizure of allegedly obscene books was also held unconstitutional in A Quantity of Books v.
Kansas.6 Although the state attorney general sought to superimpose
what he had determined to be the Marcus requirements on the warrant procedures, the Court found the Kansas procedures invalid in a
number of respects. 2 7 The plurality initially objected to the lack of
judicial scrutiny of all the materials named in the information. 28 They
further objected to the state's failure to provide the appellants an
adversary hearing similar to New York's and the state's seizure of all
copies of the named titles.2 9 Concluding that a seizure of books could
not be effected without a prior adversary hearing, the plurality held
that the Kansas statutes violated the fourteenth amendment.30
In the cases just discussed, restraints were held unconstitutional
when seizures or injunctions were issued against allegedly obscene
materials in the absence of or without adequate scrutiny. A more
egregious example of a prior restraint is censorship and licensing of
materials by administrative boards authorized by statute to identify
and suppress pornography.
In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,3z for example, the Court confronted a statute charging a state administrative agency with the duty
to protect the state's youth by "educat[ing] the public" about materi32
als which were obscene or which "tend[ed]" to corrupt youth.
When the commission determined materials to be obscene or corrupt26 378 U.S. 205, 206, 213 (1964).
27 Id. at 209-13.
28 Id. at 208-10. The attorney general of Kansas had named fifty-nine books in an
information, all of which were published as part of a series entitled "Nightstand Books."
Id. at 208. At an ex parte hearing the judge perused seven titles in the series and,
finding that they were probably obscene, issued a warrant for the seizure of all fiftynine titles on the basis that any "Nightstand Book" was probably obscene. Id. at 208-09.
29 Id. at 210. Two commentators have suggested that the Court was less interested
in the lack of an adversary hearing than in the mass seizure and plan to destroy all the
materials. Hirsch & Ryan, I Know It When I Seize It: Selected Problems in Obscenity, 4

LOYOLA U.L.A.L. REV. 9, 31 (1971).

30 378 U.S. at 213. Justice Harlan, dissenting, stated that the Kansas procedures,
although allowing materials to be suppressed for a short time before the hearing, did
not effect the kind of prior restraint that was of constitutional dimension. Id. at 220-22
& n.4. More central to Justice Harlan's argument was his proposition that the doctrine of
prior restraint is primarily directed to prevent suppression of political expression detrimental to the interests of public officials. He concluded that obscene matter would
rarely implicate a public official's personal interests so as to affect his judgment in determining whether or not to seek suppression of the materials. Id. at 224. Since the
proceedings were public, and since the prior restraint was, in his view, not unreasonable, he felt the balance was in favor of upholding the Kansas procedures. Id. at 220-25.
31 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
32 Id. at 59-60.
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ing, it would threaten distributors of such materials with civil and
criminal proceedings. 33 Though lacking in formal sanctioning power,
the commission was effective in causing many books, some of which
were not obscene, to be removed from distribution. 34 The Court held
this scheme to be unconstitutional, stating that even informal sanctions are enjoinable where threats of legal or other actions are levied
and there are "no safeguards . . . against the suppression of.
constitutionally protected. . . matter. 3
Similarly, in Freedman v. Maryland,36 the Court found unconstitutional a Maryland licensing plan which required submission of films
to a licensing board prior to exhibition. 37 Although acknowledging
that there was no " 'absolute freedom to exhibit, at least once, any
and every kind of motion picture' " without any prior restraint, the
majority pointed to a number of factors which rendered the statutory
procedures unconstitutional. 38 First, there was no "judicial participation" in the determination of obscenity. 39 Second, there was a great
risk of delay between any unfavorable determination by the licensing
board and its possible reversal by a court. 40 Justice Brennan determined that the "teaching" of the opinions to date was that "only a
judicial determination in an adversary proceeding . . . suffices to im33Id. at 61-63 & n.5.
34 Id. at 63-64, 67.
35 Id. at 67, 70.
36 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
37Id. at 52-53, 58-60.

38 Id. at 53-54 (quoting from Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 46
(1961)).
In Times Film, the petitioner challenged a city ordinance which required that films
be submitted for review before exhibition. 365 U.S. at 44. Times Film Corporation refused to turn the film over to be inspected and was denied a permit. Id. Petitioners
sought an injunction, claiming the Chicago ordinance, on its face, violated the first and
fourteenth amendments. Id. The Court upheld the ordinance, relying in part on Chief
Justice Hughes' opinion in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), where he propounded the principle that the concept of prior restraint was not inflexible and that
there were several "exceptional cases" where a prior restraint might be justified, among
which was that of "obscene publications." 365 U.S. at 47, 50.
The Times Film Court, however, limited its holding to the narrow proposition that
the ordinance was not facially unconstitutional. Since the petitioner did not argue the
unconstitutionality of any particular provision of the ordinance, it could not be struck
down. Id. at 49-50.
39 380 U.S. at 55. Professor Monaghan considers judicial superintendence of the
character of speech "[c]entral to first amendment due process." Monaghan, First
Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 520 (1970). He points to Manual
Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962), discussed in note 2 supra, as the first unambiguous assertion that "courts alone are competent to decide whether speech is constitutionally protected." Monaghan, supra at 520.
40 380 U.S. at 55.
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pose a valid final restraint." 4 1 Finally, the Maryland procedure put
the burden of proof on the exhibitor, rather than on the censor, thus
contravening the mandate of Bantam Books-that expression is presumed to be protected.42
The majority, however, did not rule that pre-exhibition licensing
was per se unconstitutional. Rather, such statutes would be constitutionally viable if (1) a license is granted rapidly, or, alternatively, the
censor seeks a court order enjoining exhibition of the film; (2) the
pre-trial restraint is of "the shortest fixed period compatible with
sound judicial resolution"; (3) a final determination is made by a judicial, rather than administrative, officer; and (4) judgment is promptly
43
rendered.
The Court's sensitivity to the need for judicial rather than nonjudicial determinations of the issue of obscenity vel non has led to the
imposition of strict standards for the issuance of search and seizure
warrants. As previously discussed, in Marcus v. Search Warrant the
Court determined that "warrants issued on the strength of the conclusory assertions of a single police officer, without any scrutiny by
the judge" of the allegedly obscene material, were constitutionally
invalid. 4 4 The infirmities in such a procedure were again emphasized
in Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 45 where the Court reversed the
petitioner's conviction for possession and exhibition of obscene
films. 46 Although expressly avoiding the issue of whether a judge or
magistrate need personally view allegedly obscene materials before
41 id. at 58 (eitntions omitted). The Court stated that

while the State may require advance submission of all films, in order to proceed effectively to bar all showings of unprotected films, the requirement cannot be administered in a manner which would lend an effect of finality to the
censor's determination whether a film constitutes protected expression.
Id.
42 Id. at 57-58. See also Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 412-22 (1971) (postal regulations which in effect permitted broad administrative interference with free flow of mail
to suspected distributor of pornography and which did not provide for judicial review
deemed unconstitutional infringement of first amendment rights); Teitel Film Corp. v.
Cusack, 390 U.S. 139, 139-42 (1968) (Chicago Motion Picture Censorship Ordinance
providing for administrative censorship held unconstitutional as not comporting with
Freedman requirement that censor "within a specified brief period, either issue a
license or go to court to restrain showing the film" (emphasis in original)); Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 414-15 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (forfeiture imposed after administrative finding of obscenity without provision for swift judicial review is a violation of first amendment).
43 380 U.S. at 59.
4 367 U.S. at 731-33.
45 392 U.S. 636 (1968).
46

id. at 637.
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issuing a warrant, 47 the Court concluded that something more than
the police officer's opinion was needed:
The procedure under which the warrant issued solely upon the
conclusory assertions of the police officer without any inquiry by
the justice of the peace into the factual basis for the officer's conclusions was not a procedure "designed to focus searchingly on the
question of obscenity" . . . .48
This recognition of the need for something more than a police
officer's conclusions to support the issuance of a warrant to seize allegedly obscene materials has led to a wide prohibition of warrantless
seizures, even when made incident to a valid arrest. In Roaden v.
Kentucky, 49 the Court found such a seizure, made only on the basis
of a sheriff's viewing of a film prior to the arrest, invalid as "unreasonable under Fourth Amendment standards." 50 At the time of the
arrest, no warrant had been issued, and there had been no judicial
determination of the question of obscenity. 51 The Court employed a
contextual analysis, stating that the fourth amendment limitations on
the issuance of warrants must be determined by the nature of the
materials and the setting in which they are found. 52 The majority
distinguished materials which are allegedly pornographic from "instruments of a crime, such as a pistol or a knife. '53 Since the exigencies involved in seizing obscene materials are less weighty than in
instances of other crimes, the balance was clearly to be struck in favor
of dissemination, where the alternative is to effect prior restraints
without judicial superintendence. 5 4 In the Court's view,
[a] seizure is unreasonable, not simply because it would have been
easy to secure a warrant, but rather because prior restraint of the
47

Id.

48 Id. (quoting from Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961)).

One federal district court, however, has held that there is no requirement of a preliminary judicial finding of probable cause regarding obscenity before a seizure warrant
may issue where the warrant is
issued on the grounds that there [is] probable cause to believe that films which
[have] not been submitted to [a] Censor Board for licensing [are] being exhibited.
Star v. Preller, 375 F. Supp. 1093, 1097 (D. Md.), aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 956 (1974).
49 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
5o Id. at 499, 504.
51Id. at 498-99.
52 Id. at 501-04.
53 Id. at 502. That the objects of a search bear on its "reasonableness" may be demonstrated by Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 471-72 (1971) (dictum), and
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485-86 (1965).
54 413 U.S. at 502, 504.
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right of expression, whether by books or films, calls for a higher
hurdle in the evaluation of reasonableness. The setting of the bookstore or the commercial theater . . . invokes such Fourth Amendment warrant requirements because we examine what is "unreason55
able" in the light of the values of freedom of expression.

The Court concluded that a nonjudicially supervised seizure
would be permitted when, for the purposes of preserving evidence,
an immediate seizure is required. 56 Thus, if a seizure made pursuant
to a warrant obtained on the basis of "conclusory" assertions by a
police officer is invalid, as in Marcus, a seizure made without any
57
warrant at all is similarly infirm.
58
In Heller v. New York, a companion case to Roaden, the Court
enunciated the circumstances under which a seizure may be permissible without a prior adversary hearing. In Heller, a warrant for seizure of an allegedly obscene film issued after a judge had personally
viewed it at a local theatre. 5 9 At trial, the petitioner challenged the
indictment on fourteenth amendment grounds for failing to provide
an adversary hearing prior to the seizure. 60 The majority stated that
where there is no " 'final restraint,' " such as an injunction or destruction of the materials, there is no constitutional violat'on of the
first or fourteenth amendments when a state fails to provide a prior
adversary hearing before seizing allegedly obscene matter "as evidence in a criminal proceeding." This is so as long as (1) "the seizure
is pursuant to a warrant"; (2) the warrant issues on an impartial
magistrate's finding probable cause; (3) a prompt adversary hearing
and judicial determination follows the seizure if so requested by an
interested party; and (4) the exhibitor is accorded the opportunity to
make a copy which he may show pending final judicial determination
if he can demonstrate that no other copies are available. 6 ' Thus, the
55 Id. at 504 (footnote omitted).
56 Id. at 505.
.7

Id. at 506.

58 413 U.S. 483 (1973).

59 Id. at 485.
60 Id. at 487. The opinion noted that the petitioner had never made any pretrial
objection to the seizure of film nor did he seek its return. Further, no request was made
for an "expedited judicial consideration of the obscenity issue," which New York would
have granted. Id. at 490 & n.6.
61 Id. at 490, 492-93.
It is unclear as yet whether the opportunity to make a copy of the seized film to
show pending a final determination creates a broad immunity from police interference
or merely provides exhibitors with the bare right to obtain a copy which may again be
seized if it is commercially exhibited. Compare Bradford v. Wade, 386 F. Snpp. 1156,
1160 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (although state considered each showing of a film as a separate
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Court concluded that while an adversary hearing was not required
prior to seizure, "a prior judicial determination of probable cause"
and a prompt resolution of the obscenity issue in an adversary hearing were necessary to protect first amendment interests against "gross
abuses. "62
First amendment issues within the prior restraint context, however, have not been fully resolved. Since Roaden and Heller, the
Court has not produced a major opinion dealing with prior restraints
offense, repeated seizures of film shown by exhibitor during pendency of litigation were
an unconstitutional form of censorship where police actions were aimed at closing
plaintiffs' business and where costs of purchasing bailbonds and new copies of films
would in fact drive plaintiffs out of business) with Inland Empire Enterprises, Inc. v.
Morton, 365 F. Supp. 1014, 1015-17 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (although state considered each
showing of a film as a separate offense, repeated seizures of film exhibited during pendency of litigation was a constitutional exercise of police authority, at least where no
bad faith was shown).
It would seem, however, that repeated seizures during the pendency of litigation
would render the right to obtain and exhibit a copy nugatory, and thus the intentions of
the police should not be a dispositive factor. See Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance,
404 F. Supp. 33, 48-50 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Bradford v. Wade, 376 F. Supp. 45, 47 (N.D.
Tex. 1974).
62 413 U.S. at 493. The Court declared that it had never expressly or impliedly
concluded that there was a right to a prior adversary hearing in all cases, emphasizing
that an adversary hearing was not absolutely required where, as here, there had been a
valid warrant for the seizure of the films. Id. at 492-93. Chief Justice Burger distinguished United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971), and Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), as establishing protection against censorship in the
form of administrative delay, noting that they did not mandate an adversary hearing
"prior to initial seizure." 413 U.S. at 489 (emphasis in original).
The Court was, however, careful in heading off any possible misinterpretation as to
how broadly the opinion was to be read. It specifically endorsed Marcus and A Quantity of Books as standing for the proposition that a prior adversary hearing is required
where large scale seizures are instituted, with destruction of the materials as the ultimate goal. Id. at 491.
Chief Justice Burger distinguished Marcus and A Quantity of Books from the present situation where the requirement of a lawful warrant was sufficient protection. The
Court's decision not to require an adversary hearing was based in part on its taking
judicial notice of the ease with which films may be disposed of, transported away, or
altered. Id. at 493.
One federal appellate court has, nonetheless, permitted a mass seizure where there
was no state plan to destroy the materials and where the defendants might destroy, secrete, or transport away evidence. In C. I. Distributors, Inc. v. Murphy, 490 F.2d 1167,
1168-70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 939 (1974), the Second Circuit upheld as constitutional what was in effect a constructive mass seizure of allegedly obscene materials.
The police did not actually take the materials but rather posted a guard on them, preventing their removal "until an adversary hearing could be held . . . the following morning." 490 F.2d at 1168. Plaintiffs argued that Heller commanded that seizure of materials in excess of that required for evidentiary purposes was proscribed. Id. at 1168. The
court, without explanation, rejected the argument as too broad a reading of Heler, emphasizing the minimal impact of the restraint. Id. at 1169.
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in the obscenity area. State and lower federal courts, in contrast,
have been extremely active in this area, deciding many questions left
unanswered by the Supreme Court and, in many instances, apparently eroding that Court's very extensive anti-restraint strictures.
One of the questions expressly left unanswered by the Supreme
Court is whether a magistrate must personally view the allegedly obscene materials before issuing a warrant on probable cause or
whether something more than "the conclusory assertions of [a] police
officer" 6 3 suffices.
In United States v. Sherpix, Inc. ,64 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a conviction based
on a search warrant which had been supported only by an F.B.I.
agent's affidavit containing a detailed account of the film. 65 Rejecting the defendant's claim that the magistrate must personally view
the materials, the court concluded that the F. B. I. agent's affidavit
provided the magistrate with the information necessary to make a reasoned determination that there was probable cause to believe the film
66
obscene and thus to issue the seizure warrant.
Similarly, in Eliwest Stereo Theatres, Inc. v. Nichols, 67 a United
States district court in Florida upheld the constitutional validity of a
procedure whereby seizure warrants were issued by a county judge
on the strength of police affidavits describing the details of several
designated films. 6 8 The court cited Heller for the proposition that a
judicial officer must make a determination of probable cause before a
seizure warrant can issue. 6 9 It was satisfied, however, that the procedure was faithful to the Heller mandate in that the affidavits were
Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 US. 636, 637 (1968).
512 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
65Id. at 1368-69.
66 Id. The court relied in part on the rationale it had articulated in a previous case,
United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 402-04 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1127 (1975). See 512 F.2d at 1368-69. In Pryba, the court had rejected the defendant's
challenge to the constitutionality of a search made pursuant to a warrant which was
based in part on hearsay allegations. 502 F.2d at 402, 404. Here the affiant, an F.B.I.
agent, never personally viewed any of the films but rather received his information from
an airline freight supervisor. Id. at 394-95, 402-03, 410-11.
The court concluded that if the hearsay is credible, and reveals some facts upon
which the informant relied in reaching his conclusion "that a crime had been committed," it would be constitutionally acceptable, providing that some showing of the
informant's reliability is made. Id. at 402-03; cf. United States v. Cangiano, 491 F.2d
906, 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 904 (1974).
67 403 F. Supp. 857 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
61 Id. at 859, 863.
69 Id. at 860.
63

64
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very detailed and made no conclusions as to the obscenity of the
films. 70 Moreover, the integrity of the procedure was protected by
the fact that an affiant would not likely delude a magistrate because
the film would, in any event, be reviewed in the subsequent adversary hearing. 71
Although the foregoing cases held that at a minimum, a valid
warrant is necessary for a seizure of allegedly obscene materials,
Roaden suggested that exigency might be the basis for an exception to
the warrant requirement in situations where seizure for evidentiary
purposes is a " 'now or never' " choice. 72 A number of courts have
attempted to define those circumstances which would call forth such
an exception.
In Smith v. United States, 73 the Sixth Circuit upheld a warrantless seizure where undercover agents had purchased allegedly obscene materials from appellants, arrested them, and seized approximately 2100 films and 280 tapes. 74 The court based its affirmance on
two factors. First, there was no opportunity to obtain a seizure warrant prior to the appellants' having moved the materials from their
car to the motel where the transaction was scheduled to take place,
because the agents had no knowledge of where the films and tapes
were kept. 75 Second, the " 'underground' " quality of the business
was such that the court would not " 'presumptively invoke First
Amendment protection.' "76
70

Id. at 860-61. See also State v. Thompkins, 263 S.C. 472, 479-80, 211 S.E.2d 549,
551 (1975).
"' 403 F. Supp. at 861.
72 413 U.S. at 505.
73 505 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1974).
74 Id. at 825, 828-29.
75 Id. at 828-29.
7
1Id. at 829 (quoting from United States v. Cangiano, 491 F.2d 906, 913 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 904 (1974)). In Cangiano, the Second Circuit upheld as constitutional mass seizures made without first providing an adversary hearing, where the defendants had stored large quantities of pornographic materials in a car, apartment, and
basement. 491 F.2d at 911-14.
The court distinguished A Quantity of Books, Marcus, and Lee Art Theatre on the
ground that those seizures occurred in commercial bookstores or theatres. The court
then quoted Roaden for the proposition that the reasonableness of a search of a bookstore or commercial theatre is determined by an interplay of the first and fourth amendments. Reading "bookstore" and "commercial theatre" as exclusive rather than as illustrative terms, the court concluded that " '[t]he setting' . . . [was] hardly such as to
presumptively invoke First Amendment protection," since the seizures had not taken
place in a bookstore or theatre, but rather in "clandestine storage facilities not intended
to be available to the public, but only to its trusted customers." Id. at 913.
But see United States v. Alexander, 428 F.2d 1169, 1170-71, 1175 (8th Cir. 1970)
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Faced with very similar facts, the Supreme Court of California
chose to read Roaden's "exigency" language more narrowly, affirming
77
the trial court's suppression of evidence seized without a warrant.
In People v. Superior Court, 78 police agents went to the defendants'
place of business and negotiated the purchase of stag films which the
79
defendants assured them depicted various ultimate sexual acts.
After actually viewing one of the films, an undercover officer arrested
one of the defendants and seized the film as well as an album containing still photographs which had apparently depicted scenes from some
of the films. 80 When the second defendant returned to the office, he
(furtive manner in which material is distributed and size of segment of public affected
by seizure are not rational bases for eliminating the requirement of a prior adversary
hearing pursuant to a mass seizure). See also Note, The Right to an Adversary Hearing
on the Issue of Obscenity Prior to the Seizure of Furtively Distributed Films, 69 MICH.
L. REV. 913 (1971).
77 People v. Superior Ct., 14 Cal. 3d 82, 87-91, 534 P.2d 393, 397-400, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701-04 (1975).
71 14 Cal. 3d 82, 534 P.2d 393, 120 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1975).
79 Id. at 86, 534 P.2d at 396, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 700. The state argued that it was
unnecessary to obtain a warrant, because the defendant had waived the warrant requirement by his own representations as to the character of the films. The state based
its argument on two California cases, one of which relied on Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463 (1966). 14 Cal. 3d at 87-88, 534 P.2d at 396-97, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01.
In Ginzburg, the defendant had launched a massive advertising campaign with the
mailing of millions of brochures announcing the publication of EROS, a magazine of
"sexual candor." 383 U.S. at 468 & n.9.
Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Clark, Fortas, and
White, provided a major restatement (but not repudiation) of the standard articulated in
Roth: "[I]n close cases evidence of pandering may be probative with respect to the
nature of the material in question and thus satisfy the Roth test." Id. at 474 (footnote
omitted). Examining Ginzburg's conduct, Justice Brennan determined that Ginzburg
had been engaged in "the sordid business of pandering," citing two aspects of
Ginzburg's behavior: his taste for unusual mailing addresses and his methods of advertising. Id. at 467-70. In the Justice's view, these activities revealed " 'the leer of the
sensualist.' " Id. at 468.
The Court affirmed Ginzburg's conviction, declaring that
[w]here an exploitation of interests in titillation by pornography is shown with
respect to material lending itself to such exploitation through pervasive treatment or description of sexual matters, such evidence may support the determination that the material is obscene even though in other contexts the material would escape such condemnation.
Id. at 475-76.
In response to the state's argument in People v. Superior Court that the Ginzburg
rationale could be applied as a justification for eliminating the warrant requirement, the
Supreme Court of California disagreed, stating that Ginzburg was limited to determinations of obscenity and inapplicable in the context of search and seizure. 14 Cal. 3d at
88, 534 P.2d at 397-98, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 701-02.
"014 Cal. 3d at 86, 534 P.2d at 396, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
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was also arrested, and the films in the trunk and on the back seat of
8
his car were seized. '
The state argued that under Roaden, the circumstances constituted " 'a legitimate emergency.' "82 The court disagreed, finding the
exception to be a very narrow one, arising only when two conditions
are met: There must be probable cause, and the "opportunity for
seizure" must be " 'now or never.' "13 Here, the films which had
been removed from the car were never viewed by the officers; thus,
probable cause as to their obscenity was negated. 8 4 Further, as to the
film and photographs seized in the office, a warrant should have been
obtained. Since the transaction had occurred at defendants' place of
business which was a "continuing enterprise," there was no im85
mediate danger of the evidence being moved.
Another issue which has received much attention by courts today
is whether the numerous procedural safeguards against prior restraints may be circumvented through the use of a nuisance proceeding. Traditionally, acts or activities which are deemed immoral are
termed "public nuisances." Thus, prostitution, gambling, lewd exhibitions, or other disapproved activities are often prohibited by nuisance
statutes. 86 Although public nuisances are dealt with as minor criminal
offenses, some states have established procedures whereby a prosecutor may institute civil proceedings in an equity court. This approach has proved very alluring to public officials who attempt to gain
tactical advantages in fighting the sale and exhibition of obscene materials.
The use of an equity proceeding eliminates the need for jury
trials and offers the weapon of injunctive relief, not only against a
particular item, but against the operation of the business as a whole,
81 Id.
83

Id. at 89, 534 P.2d at 398, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
Id.

84

Id.

82

Id. Justice Richardson dissented, finding that both Roaden requirements for a
warrantless search had been met. First, the probable cause requirement was satisfied by
the totality of the circumstances-in particular, the officer's viewing of a film. Second,
there was a great likelihood that evidence would be removed or destroyed even though
the defendants had a business office. Id. at 93-94, 534 P.2d at 401-02, 120 Cal. Rptr. at
705-06.
8 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 86-87, at 572-73, 586 (4th
ed. 1971). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1214 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
In those states which use nuisance statutes to control obscenity, the proceeding is
generally instituted by a district attorney or other law enforcement official. A number of
states, however, permit private individuals to file complaints, even without a showing of
special injury. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11226 (West 1970); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:4712 (Supp. 1976); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4667(a) (Supp. 1975-76).
85
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thereby avoiding litigation over individual items.8 7 However, such
broad powers to suppress expression are clearly fraught with constitutional issues, and courts have, for the most part, sharply circumscribed the extent to which obscenity may be suppressed through
the operation of public nuisance statutes.
In Gulf States Theatres of Louisiana, Inc. v. Richardson,"8 the
Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the constitutionality of a
statutorj civil action for the abatement of the nuisance of obscenity
where the statute provided "for an ex parte temporary injunction and
for permanent injunction after hearing on a rule nisi to abate the
nuisance perpetually." 8 9 Violations of an injunction subjected the violator to a contempt penalty.9 0 Additionally, the property upon which
the nuisance had taken place could be sold to pay the contempt
fines. 9 ' Also, the statute mandated that the premises be closed for up
to a year. 9 2 The nuisance proceeding was initiated upon the allegations of a prosecutor or parish official or the certified allegations of
any other complaining party. In either event, a temporary injunction
would issue mandatorily. 93 The statute made the judge's participation
ministerial, providing no opportunity for judicial evaluation of the
merits of the petition.' -94
The court in Gulf States Theatres held the statute unconstitutional in a number of respects. The majority first determined that the
absence of judicial discretion in the granting of a temporary injunction impinged upon first amendment interests by not requiring that
probable cause be shown. 9 5 Moreover, the court determined that a
probable cause requirement "for a criminal search warrant" could not
"be read into a civil statute for abatement of nuisance." 9 6 The court
then pointed out that the temporary injunction which had been issued by the trial court and directed at all copies of the film constituted a prior restraint as encompassing as the seizures held unconstitutional in Marcus.97 Reasoning that subpoenas duces tecum were
Comment, Can an Adult Theater or Bookstore Be Abated as a Public Nuisance in
California?, 10 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 115, 115-17 (1975).
88 287 So. 2d 480 (La. 1974).
87

89Id. at 485.
90

Id.

91Id.
92

Id.

93Id.

at 485-86.

94Id.

at 486 (quoting from State v. Gulf States Theatres of Louisiana, Inc., 255 So.
2d 857, 860 (La. App. 1971)).
95 287 So. 2d at 486, 493.
96

Id. at 486.

97

Id. at 487.
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available in a civil proceeding, the court concluded that no exigency
could compel the use of an injunction and the shutting down of the
theatre. 98
The prohibitions of future expression effected by the closing of a
theatre as well as the contempt fines which are levied when the exhibitor does not comply with the injunction were also held to be prior
restraints violative of the Louisiana constitution. 9 9 The court distinguished prospective abatements of gambling or prostitution from
prospective abatements of a means of expression. It concluded that
in a freedom-of-expression context "there is a perfectly valid distinction between prior restraint and accountability after abuse."' 0 0
In Sanders v. State, 10 1 the Supreme Court of Georgia struck
down a Georgia nuisance statute which authorized a shutdown of an
entire business if it could be proved that a single obscene publication
had been sold. 10 2 The court reasoned that the presence of one ob98Id. at 489. Although use of a subpoena duces tecum in a civil proceeding presents
no constitutional problems, its use in a criminal obscenity proceeding raises fifth
amendment issues which have been unevenly resolved by the courts. For example, in
Smith v. Fair, 363 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1373 (6th Cir. 1974),
the defendants were charged with showing obscene films. The prosecutor moved for a
prior adversary hearing and a subpoena duces tecum issued ordering the defendants to
bring the films to the hearing. 363 F. Supp. at 1021-22. The defendants argued that a
subpoena requiring production of evidence violated their fifth amendment rights. The
state argued that the films were " 'non-testimonial' " and thus not within the protection
of the fifth amendment. Id. at 1022.
Tracing fifth amendment history, the court concluded that with one exception
-Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)-all the cases required that the defendant aid in the production of evidence only for purposes of identification. 363 F. Supp.
at 1023-25. The court distinguished Schmerber, which had held that blood tests used to
establish alcohol levels are constitutional, on the basis that the defendant in Schmerber
was neutral throughout the process of extraction, whereas the defendant in the case at
bar would be forced to actively obtain evidence which he might or might not possess
and then to bring it to court to be used against him. Id. at 1025. Such a result was, in
the court's view, unconstitutional. Id.
Confronting a similar scenario, the Supreme Court of Colorado decided the case of
Houston v. Manerbino, 185 Colo. 1, 521 P.2d 166 (1974). Here, the defendant also objected on fifth amendment grounds to a subpoena duces tecum which required production of allegedly obscene films at an adversary hearing. Id. at 4-5, 521 P.2d at 167-68.
The court rejected the argument on the basis that the fifth amendment was a bulwark
against compelling the production of "testimonial or communicative" evidence. The
opinion termed it "ludicrous" that one could publicly exhibit a film and then claim a
fifth amendment privilege in order to avoid producing the film at an adversary hearing.
Id. at 8-9, 521 P.2d at 170.
The law is unclear on this issue, but a recent Supreme Court case indicates that the
decision of the Colorado supreme court may be the better one. See Fisher v. United
States, 96 S. Ct. 1569, 1578-82 (1976).
99 287 So. 2d at 491.
100 Id.
101231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974).
102 Id.
at 613, 203 S.E.2d at 157.
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scene article cannot be the basis for a blanket determination that a
business is obscene. 10 3 The majority also concluded that an injunction
against expression, when operating to bar future distribution of possi04
bly nonobscene materials, is unconstitutional.1
The Third Circuit has taken an even more negative view regarding the appropriateness of the public nuisance approach as a means of
controlling the sale or exhibition of obscenity. In Grove Press Inc. v.
City of Philadelphia,10 5 that court affirmed a federal district court's
injunction against state interference with the exhibition of a film, determining that public nuisance concepts "may not be used . . . both

to define the standards of protected speech and to serve as the vehicle for its restraint."106
The court reasoned that the terms " 'injury to the public' " and

"'unreasonableness' "---declared by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to be " 'the essence of a public nuisance' "-lacked the requisite degree of preciseness and narrowness to survive constitutional
challenge. 10 7 The circuit court viewed such terms as "too elastic and
amorphous," and further concluded that public nuisance is a "sprawling doctrine" which impinges upon first amendment rights in the
same manner as a vague and overbroad statute. 10 8 Thus, the city's
argument that the exhibition of allegedly obscene material is a per se
"unreasonable use of expression" was rejected.109
Many jurisdictions have, nonetheless, approved the use of public
nuisance proceedings to control obscenity." 0 Yet, in most instances,
103

Id.

1041d.
105 418 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1969).
106 Id. at 88, 91.
107 Id.
at 87-88.
10 Id. See also General Corp. v. State ex rel. Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657, 666-67, 320 So.
2d 668, 676-77 (1975). The court, although permitting a sharply circumscribed employment of the public nuisance statute to prevent exhibition of obscene films, expressed its
dissatisfaction with that approach:
[P]ublic nuisance doctrine . . .is ill-equipped to cope with the intricacies of
First Amendment guaranties. The law of nuisance cannot become a vehicle for
the protection of the sensibilities of the overly fastidious; nor can the doctrine
of nuisance serve as a means of circumventing these First Amendment
safeguards.
Id. at 667, 320 So. 2d at 676-77.
109 418 F.2d at 87-88; accord, Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 347 A.2d 290, 303 (Pa.
1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.LAW. 3445 (U.S. Jan. 28, 1976) (No. 75-1073).
110 See, e.g., Grove Press, Inc. v. Flask, 326 F. Supp. 574, 578-79 (N.D. Ohio 1970),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 413 U.S. 902 (1973); General Corp. v. State ex
rel. Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657, 666-67, 320 So. 2d 668, 676-77 (1975); Cactus Corp. v. State
ex rel. Murphy, 14 Ariz. App. 38, 41-42, 480 P.2d 375, 378-79 (1971); People ex rel.
Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 16 Cal. 3d 360, 371-73, 546 P.2d 733, 740-41, 128 Cal.
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the nuisance statute, as written or construed, severely limits the restraints that may be placed on expression. Some courts have held that
a judicial determination of obscenity must be rendered either prior
to1 ' or very soon after institution of a nuisance proceeding.' 1 2 Some
jurisdictions have refused to permit padlocking of the premises or sale
of the fixtures and personalty within the premises as a means of abating the nuisance.113
Clearly, the direction taken by most courts is to examine the
practical operation of the nuisance statute and gauge its validity in
terms of its tendency to create prior restraints as well as its tendency
to suppress nonobscene materials. Although the Supreme Court has
indicated in dictum that public nuisance statutes are a constitutionally
valid method of dealing with obscenity, 1 4 that Court, however, has
held that nuisance laws are subject to the requirements of the first
Rptr. 229, 236-37 (1976); People ex rel. Hicks v. Sarong Gals, 42 Cal. App. 3d 556,
562-63, 117 Cal. Rptr. 24, 28-29 (1974); Mitchem v. State ex rel. Schaub, 250 So. 2d 883,
884 (Fla. 1971); Evans Theatre Corp. v. Slaton, 227 Ga. 377, 382, 180 S.E.2d 712, 716
(1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Society To Oppose Pornography, Inc. v.
Thevis, 255 So. 2d 876, 880-81 (La. App. 1971), cert. denied, 257 So. 2d 158 (La. 1972),
appeal dismissed, 273 So. 2d 653 (La. App. 1973); State ex rel. Cahalan v. Diversified
Theatrical Corp., 59 Mich. App. 223, 238, 229 N.W.2d 389, 396 (1975); State ex rel.
Ewing v. "Without A Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 98-99, 103, 307 N.E.2d 911, 914, 917
(1974), appeal dismissed sub nom. Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. Ewing, 421 U.S. 923
(1975); Locke v. State, 516 S.W.2d 949, 954-55 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). But see Grove
Press Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F.2d 82, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1969); Olympic Drive-In
Theatre, Inc. v. City of Pagedale, 441 S.W.2d 5, 9 (Mo. 1969).
I" See, e.g., People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 16 Cal. 3d 360, 375,
546 P.2d 733, 742, 128 Cal. Rptr. 229, 238 (1976) (although public nuisance statute may
provide means to regulate exhibition of obscene films or photos, a prior adversary hearing is required before an injunction may be issued).
112 See, e.g., General Corp. v. State ex rel. Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657, 666, 320 So. 2d
668, 676 (1975).
113 See, e.g., Society To Oppose Pornography, Inc. v. Thevis, 255 So. 2d 876, 881
(La. App. 1971), cert. denied, 257 So. 2d 158 (La. 1972), appeal dismissed, 273 So. 2d
653 (La. App. 1973). But see State ex rel. Cahalan v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 59
Mich. App. 223, 237, 229 N.W.2d 389, 396 (1975) (padlocking defendant's premises for
one year did not constitute a prior restraint because defendant was not precluded from
exhibiting nonobscene films; rather, he was only precluded from exhibiting them in the
padlocked theater); State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without A Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 104-05,
307 N.E.2d 911, 917-18 (1974), appeal dismissed sub nom. Art Theater Guild, Inc. v.
Ewing, 421 U.S. 923 (1975).
114 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1973) where the Supreme Court in dictum stated that public nuisance proceedings may be a constitutionally acceptable means to enjoin exhibition of obscene films:
[S]uch a procedure provides an exhibitor or purveyor of materials the best
possible notice, prior to any criminal indictments, as to whether the materials
are unprotected by the First Amendment and subject to state regulation.
(Footnote omitted.)
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amendment. 11 5 Since it is evident that any nuisance statute must
provide both substantive and procedural first amendment safeguards
in order to withstand constitutional attack, the public nuisance approach may lose its special appeal to prosecutors as a means of controlling obscenity.
PRIOR RESTRAINTS-A PROCEDURAL APPROACH

Unquestionably, nuisance statutes, as well as administrative controls, searches and seizures, and injunctions, constitute a variety of
methods by which first amendment freedoms are pitted against the
state's desire to control the dispersion of items which are possibly
obscene. The following suggested procedures are designed to achieve
a balance consistent with prevailing constitutional interpretations and
to provide guidelines which focus on the nature of the restraint rather
than on the nature of the possibly obscene materials.
Whenever the state seeks to seize material on the ground that it
is obscene, a court must first determine whether the material in
question is or is not probably obscene. At this initial stage, the determination may be ex parte, but it must be made by a judge and
must be based upon specific, objective description by an affiant or
upon actual observation by the judge. The standard employed should
be a strict one, certainly in excess of the normal warrant requirement
of probable cause.
If the court initially determines that the material is not probably
obscene, the proceedings should halt; no relief may be granted. If, on
115 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). Here, the Supreme Cnlrt
held as facially invalid a city ordinance which made it a public nuisance to exhibit
anything which displayed bare human buttocks, genitals, or bare female breasts when
such exhibition was visible from public locations. Id. at 206-07. The majority reasoned
that the "ordinance discriminat[ed] . . . on the basis of content" and that it was insensitive to the potential educational or other value that might inhere in certain films, etc.,
containing nudity. Id. at 211 (footnote omitted). Further, the protection-of-minors argument proved unconvincing in this instance because minors were deemed to have first
amendment rights of their own which extend to viewing nudity that is not obscene. Id.
at 212-13. The argument that such nudity is an invasion of the right of privacy of sensitive individuals was also rejected because, as the Court noted, such individuals can
easily avert their eyes. Id. at 210-12.
The Court has also indicated that the absence of prior restraints is a significant
factor in judging the validity of a public nuisance statute. In approving Georgia's nuisance procedures the Court stated that
Georgia imposed no restraint on the exhibition of the films involved in this
case until after a full adversary proceeding and a final judicial determination
by the Georgia Supreme Court that the materials were constitutionally unprotected.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1973) (footnote omitted).
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the other hand, the court finds that the proffered material is probably
obscene, it should proceed to the second relevant question: Will the
relief sought effectively prohibit the distribution or display of the
material? If the answer to this question is affirmative, the relief, as
sought, may not be granted without an adversary hearing.
In order to answer this question, it will be necessary for the
court to make additional findings of fact, at least on a preliminary
basis. The court should inquire into the number of items to be seized
and relate that to the total number in possession to determine the
degree to which the order acts as a restraint. The seizure from a store
of one magazine out of one hundred of that issue, for example, would
probably have very little effect on its availability for distribution. Seizing a store's only copy of a particular magazine, on the other hand,
would clearly prevent its distribution, at least through that outlet.
With respect to publications or photographs the problems presented to the state by this procedure will probably be slight; a single
copy may easily be purchased and preserved. With respect to films,
the approach taken in Heller suffices: A single copy of a film may only
be seized if the distributor or exhibitor is allowed to make a copy
which he may show pending final judicial determination.
In any event, a seizure of allegedly obscene materials in excess of
that which is required for evidentiary purposes may not be permitted
without a prior adversary hearing unless special exigency can be demonstrated. Similarly, since an injunction, unless defied, cuts off the
availability of the material to the public, there is little difference in
effect between an injunction against distribution or exhibition and a
mass seizure. Thus, injunctive relief should, with one exception,
never be granted without a prior adversary hearing.
The exception operates where, after an ex parte judicial determination of probable obscenity, it is clear that the materials would be
exhibited or distributed to minors. In such a case, a court should be
allowed to enjoin this distribution or exhibition to minors providing
that an adversary hearing is afforded within a short time-48 hours
for example-at which hearing the state would have the burden of
proving the obscenity of the materials. This exception to the proposal
that there be no injunctions prior to an adversary hearing derives
from the traditional deference to a state's interest in protecting
minors from the perceived harmful effects of obscene matter that
courts have displayed when balancing first amendment rights against
16
restraints on expression.1
116See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631-43 (1968).
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Nuisance statutes, although often creating more extensive prior
restraints than those effected by searches and seizures, can nonetheless be written so as to avoid constitutional problems. For example,
Ohio's nuisance provisions, as construed by that state's supreme
court, avoid many of the pitfalls normally attendant upon a state's
attempt to regulate obscenity. First, after the filing of an abatement
action and application for a temporary injunction, defendants are required to be notified "of the time and place of hearing on the application . . . at least five days before the hearing."1 1 7 Thus, no restraint
may issue prior to a judicial conclusion that the material is obscene.
Secondly, an injunction may affect only those materials found to be
obscene." 8 Third, although the statute "requires the removal and
sale of all personal property used in conducting the nuisance," this
penalty may be avoided if within a prescribed time limit, the owner
appears in court and demonstrates that he had "neither actual or constructive knowledge that his property was being used to maintain a
nuisance."" 9 Fourth, an owner may have his establishment reopened
by paying the statutory fines, filing a bond in the amount of the full
value of the property, and convincing the court that he will prevent a
recurrence of the nuisance. The court pointed out that this does not
create a prior restraint because an owner is free to exhibit other films
20
not judicially declared obscene in the nuisance proceeding. 1
Although the Ohio nuisance provisions display sensitivity to first
amendment considerations, it is submitted that padlocking and sale
of fixtures and personalty are constitutionally deficient methods of
abatement in that they clearly restrain the exhibition of possibly nonobscene materials. Hence, these procedures sweep too broadly and
clash with the fundamental principle that speech may be restricted
only after it is uttered or disseminated and only after a judicial determination that it is unprotected. Further, the methods by which an
exhibitor or purveyor may extricate himself from the harsh strictures
117 State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without A Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 98-99, 307 N.E.2d
911, 914 (1974), appeal dismissed sub nom. Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. Ewing, 421 U.S.
923 (1975) (construing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.04 (Page 1971)).
1,8 State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without A Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 99, 307 N.E.2d 911,
914 (1974), appeal dismissed sub nom. Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. Ewing, 421 U.S. 923
(1975).
"9 State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without A Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 104, 307 N.E.2d
911, 917 (1974), appeal dismissed sub nom. Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. Ewing, 421 U.S.
923 (1975).
120 State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without A Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 104-05, 307 N.E.2d
911, 917-18 (1974), appeal dismissed sub nom. Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. Ewing, 421
U.S. 923 (1975).
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of the abatement statute do not salvage that statute's constitutionality: Individuals do not have the burden of avoiding prior restraints.
Rather, as the cases make clear, prior restraints must be justified by
exigency, and the government bears the burden of demonstrating
such exigency.
COMMUNITY STANDARDS

The Miller opinion's second major area of impact was its determination that in applying community standards in the evaluation of
materials, the standards need not be " 'national standards.' "121 Although it was not until a later case that this rather ambiguous pronouncement was clarified, 122 the Court did make clear that any
concept of a " 'national standard' " was "hypothetical and unascertainable," and that, at least in Miller, the community would be the
state of California. 123 In approving the use of the state as an accepta121

413 U.S. at 31. The adoption of the local standards approach by a majority of the

Supreme Court resolved a longstanding debate. See Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,
370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (national standards to be applied in federal prosecution) (Harlan, J.); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-95 (1964) (national standards to be applied
in state prosecution) (Brennan, J.); id. at 200 (local community standard to be applied in
state prosecution) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). For discussions of community standards
arguments prior to Miller see Shugrue & Zieg, An Atlas for Obscenity: Exploring
Community Standards, 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 157, 160-66 (1974); Obscenity: The Lingering Uncertainty, 2 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 9-12 (1972).
122 See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (discussed in text accompanying
notes 124-27 infra).
123 413 U.S. at 30-34. In addition to holding that community standards are appropriate, the Court in a companion case, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973), held that the state need not introduce " 'expert' affirmative evidence" as to the
obscenity of allegedly obscene materials because such items "are the best evidence of
what they represent." Id. at 56 (footnote omitted).
In a subsequent case, the Court determined that local standards would also obtain
where the prosecution is brought under a federal statute. Hamling v. United States, 418
U.S. 87, 105 (1974). Justice Brennan, dissenting, feared that application of local standards in judging the obscenity vel non of materials both invaded the congressional prerogative by imposing standards never contemplated by Congress when enacting the
statute and chilled the first amendment rights of national distributors who would avoid
the risk of a multiplicity of prosecutions. Id. at 142-45.
Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, discounted these objections on the basis that
since distributors were, in any event, subject to differing liabilities based on state criminal laws, the imposition of varying liability in a federal prosecution did not create a
"constitutional impediment." Id. at 106. He further noted that authority for applying
community standards to federal offenses had been established in United States v. 12
200-Foot Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973), which had stated that the Miller
"'standards are applicable to federal legislation.' " 418 U.S. at 105 (quoting from United
States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Film, supra at 130 (footnote omitted)).
The Hamling decision, though opting for nonfederal standards, went on to say that
the trial court would not be precluded from admitting evidence pertaining to standards
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ble relevant community, the Court left open the questions of whether
smaller geographic areas could also be used as acceptable relevant
communities and whether it is a requirement that a trial court indicate to the jury the particular relevant community from which they
are to draw standards.
Both questions were addressed by the Court in Jenkins v.
Georgia.12 4 In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the majority held that
there was no constitutional requirement that a trial court in a state
obscenity proceeding instruct a jury that the state is to be used as a
other than those of the district when circumstances indicated that such evidence would
assist jurors in their deliberations. Id. at 106. This dictumn virtually invited the litigation
that soon followed, in that the Court neglected to suggest circumnstances warranting the
use of non-district standards, failed to indicate whether there was any limitation on
distance from the district, and failed to indicate the degree to which reliance on nondistrict standards might supersede reliance on district standards.
In United States v. Elkins, 396 F. Supp. 314 (C.D. Cal. 1975), for example, a
California district court dismissed an indictment against distributors of allegedly obscene matter who had mailed some of it to Iowa. Id. at 316, 318. The indictment had
originally been brought in the northern district of Iowa, but the action was ordered
transferred to California, the area most convenient to the parties and witnesses. Id. at
316. The Iowa court before ordering the transfer had first determined that the standards
to be applied were the community standards of the northern district of Iowa. Id. The
court then cited Hailing and Miller for the proposition that the transferee court could
allow evidence of the community standards of the transferor court to be introduced at
trial and applied by the jurors in place of the California standards. Id.
When the case was finally transferred to California, the Government moved for a
ruling on whether the standards of Iowa or those of the California district would apply.
The California court ruled that expert testimony on the standards of the northern district
of Iowa would be admitted but that expert testimony alone was insufficient to establish
these standards, hid On reconsideration of th at order, the court, distinguishing Hailing
on its facts, dismissed the indictment, concluding that expert testimony on Iowa community standards would be insufficient,
because of the special and integral part that the knowledge of a juror of the
community from which he comes plays in deciding what conclusion the average person applying contemporary community standards would reach in a
given case.

Id. at 316-17.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Danley, 523 F.2d 369 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1143 (1976), when faced with a similar issue, affirmed the
trial court's use of out-of-state community standards. 523 F.2d at 370-71. In Danley, the
defendants argued that because the state of Oregon had no statute proscribing the dissemination or sale to adults of obscene matter, pornography was not in conflict with
Oregon community standards and that these standards were, then, controlling. Id. at
370. At trial, the district court, finding no necessary relationship between the absence of
a statute and the conclusion that community standards in Oregon were not offended by
pornography, applied Oregon community standards and the standards of those other
states where the obscene matter had been transported. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed,
relying on Handing and pointing to the interstate nature of the defendants' activities.
Id. at 370-71.
124 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
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relevant community. 12 5 Further, it was held that the trial court need
not specify any particular community whatsoever. 126 The analysis was
brief, merely citing Miller as authority for the conclusion that
[a] State may choose to define an obscenity offense in terms of
"contemporary community standards" . .. without further
specification . . . or it may choose to define the standards in more precise
1 27
geographic terms, as was done by California in Miller.

Although prior to Miller and Jenkins, a number of jurisdictions
employed "national" community standards, 128 several states, in grappling with the problems of defining the boundaries of the relevant
community, determined the boundary to be the state or some smaller
geographic area. 1 29 After Miller, some state courts interpreted the
somewhat vague Miller language as mandating only that the standards
employed be community standards and not "national standards."' 130
Other courts were more precise in delineating the scope of the community. 13 1 It is clear, however, that both the local community and
state standards approaches are well founded.
On the one hand, use of the local community standard better
reflects the tolerance level of the community whose interest in reg125 Id. at 157.

Id.
Id.
128 See, e.g., NGC Theatre Corp. v. Mummert, 107 Ariz. 484, 487-88, 489 P.2d 823,
826-27 (1971); State v. Hudson County News Co., 41 N.J. 247, 265-66, 196 A.2d 225,
234-35 (1963); State v. Childs, 252 Ore. 91, 447 P.2d 304, 309 (1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 931 (1969).
129See, e.g., In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 580, 446 P.2d 535, 547, 72 Cal. Rptr.
655, 667 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 910 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 431, 509 P.2d 497, 514, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681, 698 (1973);
Felton v. City of Pensacola, 200 So. 2d 842, 848 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), rev'd mer.
on other grounds, 390 U.S. 340 (1968); People v. Butler, 49 111,2d 435, 438, 275 N.E.2d
400, 401 (1971); McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 149-50, 121 N.W.2d 545,
553 (1963).
1"0 See, e.g., City of Las Vegas v. Swingers, Inc., 89 Nev. 456, 457, 514 P.2d 1189,
1189-90 (1973); Ebert v. Board of Censors, 19 Md. App. 300, 309-10, 313 A.2d 536,
541-42 (1973).
"I Several state courts have concluded that the state is the relevant community.
See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473, 479, 296 So. 2d 218, 223 (1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1130 (1975); Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre I, 231 Ga. 312, 317, 201 S.E.2d 456, 460
(1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 939 (1974); McCrary v. State, 533 P.2d 629, 634 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1974); Court v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 570, 576-78, 217 N.W.2d 676, 679-80 (1974).
Other states have opted for a more localized approach, using the standards of the county,
city, or locality. See, e.g., Kansas City v. O'Connor, 510 S.W.2d 689, 696 (Mo. 1974) (per
curiam); Price v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 490, 491-92, 201 S.E.2d 798, 799, cert. denied,
419 U.S. 902 (1974).
126
127
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ulating obscenity is the source of the litigation.1 32 On the other hand,
there is virtually no limiting principle which can effectively be employed to define an ultimate grouping of individuals which may be
deemed the appropriate community from which standards should be
derived. 133 Further, there may be as much diversity within a given
34
community as that found within the state as a whole.1
Of paramount importance is the fact that, under a local community standard, undue strain is placed upon the state as well as the
defendant, because the estoppel effect of judgments would be sharply

132 In Price v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 490, 201 S.E.2d 798, cert. denied, 419 U.S.
902 (1974), the Virginia surpreme court held that the standards to he applied are those
of the locality rather than those of the nation or state, noting that statewide standards
would be impossible to establish because of the disparity in the views of metropolitan
as opposed to rural juries. 214 Va. at 491-92, 201 S.E.2d at 799-800.
1'3 See Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473, 296 So. 2d 218 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1130 (1975), where the court, in opting for state rather than local standards, described
the deficiencies of the local standards approach:
This myriad of possibilities for standards, coupled with the temporal requirement that standards be "contemporary" clearly demonstrates the burden which
would be placed on the judicial system in trying to determine which standards
are applicable at which location at which time.
292 Ala. at 480, 296 So. 2d at 224.
134 See Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473, 480, 296 So. 2d 218, 224 (1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1130 (1975). A number of other reasons have been articulated in support of a
state standard. For example, in \lcCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121
N.W.2d 545 (1963), the court concluded that the state should be the relevant community,
reasoning that there would be minimal differences between various localities in the
standards of what is obscene. Id. at 149, 121 N.W.2d at 553.
The Supreme Court of California also adonted the state as the relevant community
in In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 578, 446 P.2d 535, 545, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 665 (1968),
overruled on other grounds, Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 431, 509 P.2d 497,
514, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681, 698 (1973). The court determined that in evaluating whether
behavior was lewd, state standards were preferable to national standards because it was
doubtfil that experts could "testify knowledgeably as to that standard." 69 Cal. 2d at
578, 446 P.2d at 546, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 666. Furthermore, administrative efficiency would
be served by eliminating the necessity to define the relevant community on a case by
case basis and public policy would also be served by the establishment of uniformity in
the operation of obscenity law. Id. at 580, 446 P.2d at 547, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
Chief Justice Heflin of the Alabama supreme court echoed both the California and
Wisconsin supreme courts in his particularly well-reasoned opinion in Pierce v. State,
292 Ala. 473, 296 So. 2d 218 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1130 (1975). The opinion
emphasized the need for uniformity in law, (loting Dean Pound's thesis that civilization requires that a citizen have legal standards on which to rely so that conduct may be
adjusted to effectuate his future goals. 292 Ala. at 480-81, 296 So. 2d at 225. Chief Justice
Heflin further stated that, in reality, the purported lack of uniformity in the standards
of rural as opposed to city dwellers was exaggerated, noting the average American's
increased mobility, his susceptibility to the opinion-creating effects of mass media,
the large number of rural dwellers who work in cities, and the family and friendship ties
that exist between the two groups. Id. at 482, 296 So. 2d at 226.
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circumscribed. 135 Under the local standards approach, the state, seeking to prevent the distribution of allegedly obscene material, would
be obliged to move against the distributor or his agent in a separate
action in each local community, because the standards of each locality
may differ. Thus no decision could have any estoppel value in another
36
local community. 1
The problem which this raises for the state in civil as well as
criminal litigation is minor compared to the problems it raises for
potential defendants. For example, a theatre owner in one county
could not rely at all upon the judicial decisions of even an adjoining
locality. The threat of simultaneous prosecutions in every community
with absolutely no estoppel effect running across community lines
would, in its monetary implications and criminal exposure, inhibit
chain owners from handling questionable material.1 3 7 As a result, first
amendment rights would be chilled. To compel a party to litigate
once is probably reasonable, even if it is once in each state. To compel that party to litigate tens of times in each state and hundreds of
38
times nationwide is not.'
135 This difficulty had been anticipated by the Wisconsin supreme court in
McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W.2d 545 (1963). The court opted
for a statewide community standard, in part because different standards within the state
would frustrate the operation of a criminal statute which allowed "a judgment of obscenity to be used in a criminal trial of any person who was served with notice of it
before the alleged violation." Id. at 149-50, 121 N.W.2d at 553. Although such a statute
is unconstitutional, see notes 171-81 infra and accompanying text, variations between
community standards will limit the estoppel effect of judgments, see note 195 infra.
136 Cf. note 195 infra.
137 The inhibitory effect on distribution would seem to be exacerbated by the Supreme Court's holding in Jenkins that juries need not be instructed to apply the standards of any particular community. 418 U.S. at 157. A distributor or exhibitor would
thus be hard-pressed to map out "safe zones" based on past litigation because there is
no assurance that juries in a particular community would be applying the same standards as those employed by prior juries within the same community.
138 Harvard Law Review has recently argued that the way to avoid this multiplicity
of litigation and attendant chilling of first amendment rights is for distributors to file
class action declaratory judgment suits on the issue of " 'serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.' " Note, supra note 6, at 1861-74. Essentially, the argument is
that determinations of " 'serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value' " are of
constitutional dimension, id. at 1854, and thus "capable of being given national effect."
Id. at 1861. Hence, federal class action declaratory relief "initiated against classes of
possible prosecutors" on the "serious value" issue, if obtained, will protect national
distributors from multiple prosecutions. Id. at 1861, 1861-74.
Although the argument is extremely appealing, it is possible that the Supreme
Court would find that such a class action is inappropriate because distributors, through
skillful forum shopping, could litigate in jurisdictions which are extremely protective of
first amendment interests. In so doing, they might obtain a declaratory judgment from
federal judges who will find "serious value" in virtually anything in order not to suppress distribution.
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In contrast, using the state as the relevant community has a
number of advantages, although admittedly it is less responsive to
community values. First, there are no problems in defining the relevant community. Second, state standards are no more a fiction than
local standards since, in many instances, a juror applying local standards may not come from that community.' 39 Most important, litigation is reduced sharply because, as will be discussed in the following
section, there may be broad estoppel effect to a judgment rendered
under a state standard.
ESTOPPEL EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS

The theory of res judicata derives from the public policy of putting matters in dispute to rest.' 40 Essentially, the theory of res
judicata is that a decision on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction, unless reversed on appeal, is binding on the parties to
the suit and their privies in regard to the issues of fact and law actually litigated; hence, parties to the proceeding may not relitigate, in
the same or any other cause of action, issues that have been
decided. 141 This holds true even if the decision is not appealed, beThe Harvard Note itself, in footnote 19, suggests that in instances where the public
is hostile to placing restrictions on consenting adults to read and view what they please,
juries may find that the item in question is not obscene.
Even if the government successfully appeals that lower court determination of
nonobscenity, commercial pornographers may have distributed or exhibited the materials in the interim. Since most pornography is produced on a low budget, the exhibitors
or distributors may have made substantial profits before the judgment is reversed. Thus,
the Supreme Court may reject the use of a class action declaratory judgment as potentially disruptive of the state-federal balance that Miller sought to achieve.
'3' For example, if jurors are selected from county lists, a juror
, a highly urbanized section of a county may sit on a case arising in a rural community of the same
county. It is as possible for the standards within the county to differ as much as those of
the state as a whole.
14o The principle of res judicata as it is known today was developed in 1776 but had
originated much earlier. R. VON MOSCHZISKER, STARE DECISiS, RES JUDICATA AND
OTHER SELECTED ESSAYS 30 (1929) [hereinafter cited as VON MOSCHZlSKER]. Actually,

res judicata serves private needs as well as public needs. For the individual litigant, res
judicata serves to promote "peace and quiet in the community through the creation of
certainty in the relations of men." Id. at 31. Res judicata serves the public interest by
helping courts economize in the expenditure of time. Id. See H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS OR THE SCIENCE OF CASE LAW § 61, at 193-94
(1912); 2 A. FREEMAN, THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 626, at 1318-20 (1925) [hereinafter
cited as FREEMAN].

141 Chief Justice von Moschzisker has stated that
the rule of res judicata means that when a court of competent jurisdiction has
determined, on its merits, a litigated cause, the judgment entered, until reversed, is, forever and under all circumstances, final and conclusive as between the parties to the suit and their privies, in respect to every fact which
might properly be considered in reaching a judicial determination of the con-
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cause the application of res judicata does not derive from the status of
the court rendering the decision; 142 rather, it rests on the ground that
the party had an
opportunity for the judicial determination of an issue by a tribunal

having the requisite authority and proceeding in a manner recognized as due process of law. 143
The tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) of Judgnents has
identified two subdivisions of res judicata: Direct Estoppel, which
"precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and determined in
the first action when a second action is brought on the same claim,"
and Collateral Estoppel, which also precludes relitigation of issues
where "the second action is brought on a different claim.' 14 4 Traditionally, courts generally held that the plea of res judicata required
troversy, and in respect to all points of law there adjudged, as those points
relate directly to the cause of action in litigation and affect the fund or other
subject matter then before the court.
VON MOSCHZISKER, supra note 140, at 32-33 (footnote omitted).
142 2 FREEMAN, supra note 140, § 634, at 1336. Freeman also concludes that another
tribunal hearing the matter should apply res judicata where appropriate even though the
"rules of law, practice or evidence" are not the same as those of the first tribunal. Id. §
641, at 1349.
143 Id. § 641, at 1349-50.
144 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, comment b at 146 (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1973) (emphasis added). See also Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive
Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1010, 1012
(1966).
Res judicata and collateral estoppel are often discussed as if they are completely
separate concepts-res judicata applying to preclusion of issues in a subsequent proceeding on the same cause of action, and collateral estoppel applying to preclusion of
issues decided previously when such issues are raised in a new cause of action. See,
e.g., Hirsch & Ryan, supra note 29, at 71; Note, Collateral Estoppel: The Demise of Mutuality, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 724, 724 (1967). This terminology has been adopted by the
Supreme Court. See Lawlor v. Nat'l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955). The
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, at 294-95 (1942) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT] states that
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is operative where the second action is
between the same persons who were parties to the prior action, whether the
second action is brought by the plaintiff or by the defendant in the original
action. It is operative whether the judgment in the first action is in favor of the
plaintiff or of the defendant. A judgment for the defendant in the first action
may have the effect of furnishing a complete defense to the second action....
A judgment for the plaintiff in the first action may have the effect of enabling
him to recover in the second action without proving the facts constituting his
cause of action, provided that those facts were litigated and determined in the
prior action; but the defendant is not precluded from defending the second
action on grounds not litigated and determined in the first action.
See also Compania Mexicana v. Jernigan, 410 F.2d 718, 726 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 905 (1969).
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identity of parties as well as identity of factual issues. It had been felt
that equity demanded that there be "mutuality of estoppel," meaning
essentially that it was looked on as unfair 145 that an individual who
was not a party to a judicial proceeding and who risked nothing in
146
that proceeding should reap the benefits of another party's victory.
Thus, persons who were not parties to the original action in which
the factual issues had been determined could not plead the original
judgment in a different cause of action, even though the factual issues
were the same.
In 1942, with Justice Traynor's opinion in Bernhard v. Bank of
America National Trust & Savings Association, 147 the doctrine of
mutuality was sharply eroded. Here, the Supreme Court of California
affirmed a lower court's holding that the plaintiff was bound by the
issues determined in a prior judgment rendered against her, even
though the defendant who pleaded the prior judgment in the present
cause of action against the plaintiff had not been a party in the prior
action.' 48 Justice Traynor thought it nonsensical that a nonparty not
be allowed to plead a judgment "against a party who was bound by
it.' 149 One commentator, however, concluded, with some reserva145 See 35 YALE L.J. 607, 608-09 (1926).
146 See Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine,

9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 284 n.6 (1957).

Traditionally, the operation of a judgment as res judicata has depended on identity
of parties or their privies. VON \lOSCHZISKER, supra note 140, at 32-33. A "party" has
been defined as "one who is 'directly interested in the subject matter, and had a right to
make defense, or to control the proceeding, and to appeal from the judgment.' " Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 122 P.2d 892, 894
(1942) (quoting from 1 S. GREENLEAF, 'tHE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 523, at 661 (15th ed.
1892)).
Privies are parties who, after a judgment has been entered, obtain "an interest in
the subject matter affected by the judgment through or under one of the parties, as by
inheritance, succession, or purchase." Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav.
Ass'n, supra at 811, 122 P.2d at 894.
14719 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
148Id. at 810-14, 122 P.2d at 894-95. Today, the Bernhard doctrine is widely accepted. See, e.g., Brown v. DeLayo, 498 F.2d 1173, 1175-76 (10th Cir. 1974); Cardillo v.
Zyla, 486 F.2d 473, 475-76 (1st Cir. 1973); Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59, 61-62 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Packard
Bell Elec. Corp., 290 F. Supp. 308, 318 (C.D. Cal. 1968). Some authorities, however,
still support the mutuality requirement. See, e.g., 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.412[1], at 1809-12 (2d ed. 1974); Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of
Judgments, 35 TULANE L. REV. 301, 330 (1961).

14919 Cal. 2d at 812, 122 P.2d at 895. Justice Traynor noted that the mutuality
requirement had already been eroded in that some courts had dispensed with mutuality,
limiting the privity requirement "to the party against whom the plea of res judicata is
asserted." Id. Justice Traynor further noted that a majority of jurisdictions had already
abandoned mutuality and privity by carving out an exception for those instances where
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tions, that because courts would not have the wherewithal to make
themselves aware of the underlying conditions that had obtained in
the original litigation, such a nonparty estoppel should be allowed
only against the party who was the plaintiff in the prior litigation. As
plaintiff, he would have had a greater opportunity to control the
course of the litigation and thus to ensure that the determinations
50
would be fairly made. 1
Years later, that same commentator, upon examining the law that
had developed in the wake of Bernhard, confessed that his apprehensions about the ability of courts to adequately scrutinize the circumstances of the original cause of action had been premature. 151 Courts
have in fact displayed the ability to make sensitive inquiries into the
circumstances obtaining in the original proceeding and thus have not
limited the use of nonparty estoppels to those asserted against parties
who were plaintiffs in the prior cause of action. Rather, the approach
taken is a determination of whether "the party against whom the prior
a 'full and fair opportunity' to litijudgment [was] asserted . . . had
1 52
gate the issue in the prior suit.'
Nonetheless, one limitation on the use of collateral estoppel,
suggested by Bernhard and the ensuing cases, has persisted. A collateral estoppel may not later be used by a successful party in the original cause of action against an individual or entity not a party to that

action. 153
for those instances where a defendant who is pleading res judicata has his liability
a defendant who is pleading res judicata has his liability "dependent upon or derived
from the liability of one who was exonerated in an earlier suit brought by the same
plaintiff upon the same facts." Id. (citations omitted).
151 Currie, Civil Prodecure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REX'. 25, 28 (1965).
152 James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 461 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971); See also Brown v. DeLayo, 498 F.2d 1173, 1175-76 (10th
Cir. 1974); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934
(1964); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Packard Bell Elec. Corp., 290 F. Supp.
308, 319-20 (C.D. Cal. 1968); United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709,
728-29 (E.D. Wash. & D. Nev. 1962), aff'd in part sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Schwartz v. Public
Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 69-70, 246 N.E.2d 725, 727-28, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 958-59
(1969); B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 145-48, 225 N.E.2d 195, 197-99, 278
N.Y.S.2d 596, 599-602 (1967). For a discussion of the DeWitt case see Note, Collateral
Estoppel: The Demise of Mutuality, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 724, 738 (1967), where the author
concludes that the current trend in judicial thinking is to implement the "full-and-fairopportunity standard" rather than approaches which focus on whether the parties in the
prior suit were plaintiffs or defendants or whether the estoppel is being used "offensively or defensively." Id.
153 This limitation was enunicated by Chief Justice Traynor in Bernhard:
The criteria for determining who may assert a plea of res judicata differ
fundamentally from the criteria for determining against whom a plea of res
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For example, in Beall v. Kearney & Trecker Corp.,154 Beall sued
155
the defendant corporation for breach of an employment contract.
Beall formerly had been a patent examiner who, at retirement, was
hired by the corporation as a patent consultant. 156 During the course
of his employment, he worked on securing a reissue of a patent that
he had examined while working in the patent office. 15 7 When this fact
was discovered during the course of an infringement suit, the corporation fired him and relinquished all claims under the reissued patent
in order to preserve its original patent.15 8 When the case reached the
Seventh Circuit, the court held that Beall's conduct constituted both
a statutory conflict of interest and a violation of patent office policy
59
and thus invalidated Kearney & Trecker's entire patent.1
In Beall's breach of contract suit against Kearney & Trecker, the
company stated that it had dismissed Beall for cause, arguing that the
judgment of the Seventh Circuit was decisive of the issue and that
Beall should be estopped from litigating this issue. 160 The district
court rejected the corporation's argument, pointing out that Beall had
never been a party to the infringement suit and that any findings
regarding his activities which were determined in favor of his
employer's cause in the infringement suit were not available as an
estoppel against him in the assertion of his damage claim. 16 1 The
court stated that the due process clause of both the fifth and fourteenth amendments precluded an estoppel in this instance because
the plaintiff had no part in any aspect of the prior litigation, and thus
the customary tools available to the litigant-presentation of witnesses
and challenges to evidence-were never available to him. 1 62 To let
his rights be determined by the outcome of a suit in which he was
3
not a party clearly violated his constitutional right to due process. 16
judicata may he asserted. The requirements of due process of law forbid the
assertion of a plea of res judicata against a party unless he was hound by the
earlier litigation in which the matter was decided.
19 Cal. 2d at 811-12, 122 P.2d at 894.
154 350 F. Supp. 978 (D. Md, 1972).
155 Id. at 980.
1s6 Id.
157 Id.
158

Id.

159 Id.
160 Id. at 980-81.
16,
162
163

Id.
Id.
Id.

at 981-82.
at 982.
The court noted that it could not locate any decision which would support

the use of an estoppel in those circumstances. Id. There is, however, a Fifth Circuit
opinion which affirmed a federal district court's permitting the plea of estoppel against
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Similarly, in Humphreys v. Tann, 16 4 the Sixth Circuit reversed
the district court's granting of summary judgment, concluding that a
collateral estoppel "may be applied in favor of a stranger to the first
actions, but only against a party to that action." 65 Here, the personal
representative of a decedent who had been killed in a collision involving a TWA airliner and a small plane owned by the Tann Company
sued Tann in a federal district court in Michigan. 16 6 There were also
a number of similar suits filed by other plaintiffs.
These latter actions were transferred to Ohio, but some were not
consolidated. 16 7 In one such suit against TWA and Tann, judgment
was entered against TWA and the suit against Tann was dismissed. 168
After the dismissal, Tann moved for summary judgment on the pending Humphreys claim, urging that the dismissal in the prior suit col169
laterally estopped Humphreys from arguing Tann's negligence.
Reversing the district court's granting of the motion, the court of appeals determined that to permit an estoppel against Humphreys would
170
deprive him of due process.
a subsequent plaintiff who was not a named party in the original suit. In Cauefield v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 378 F.2d 876 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009 (1967), the
appellant plaintiffs had filed a cemetery desecration suit in federal court. Id. at 877. The
court continued the case awaiting a disposition of identical actions by numerous other
parties who had filed thier cases in the state courts. Id. The plaintiffs had testified as
witnesses in the state proceeding, and the attorney who had represented the state plaintiffs also represented the federal plaintiffs. Id. The plaintiffs admitted on appeal that the
issues tried in the federal court would be identical to those tried by the state court
plaintiffs. Moreover, the appellants conceded that there would be no new evidence or
testimony. Id. at 878.
The court pointed out that this made it clear that all the evidence favorable to the
plaintiffs had been "rejected by the state courts." Id. Although noting the normal requirement of mutuality, the court determined that the current trend was to view the requirement "less rigidly," id., and that under the "unusual facts of the case" an estoppel
against the plaintiffs was appropriate, id. at 879.
164 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974).
165 487 F.2d at 671 (emphasis in original).
166 id. at 667.
167

Id.

168

Id.

169

Id.

Id. at 671. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,
402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971), where in dictum Justice White stated that
[slome litigants-those who never appeared in a prior action-may not be
collaterally estopped without litigating the issue. They have never had a
chance to present their evidence and arguments on the claim. Due process
prohibits estopping them despite one or more existing adjudications of the
identical issue which stand squarely against their position.
See also Cardillo v. Zyla, 486 F.2d 473, 475-76 (1st Cir. 1973); Vestal, The Constitution
and Preclusion/ResJudicata,62 MICH. L. REv. 33, 47-53 (1963).
170
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Recently, the Supreme Court has affirmed the validity of the
rationales underlying the conclusions reached in Beall and Humphreys, at least to the extent of precluding a state from using a judgment of obscenity obtained in a civil proceeding as decisive of the
issue in a criminal proceeding against a different defendant.
In McKinney v. Alabama, 171 "certain mailable matter" had been
declared obscene in a civil equity proceeding in an Alabama county
circuit court, to which McKinney was not a party. 172 Shortly thereafter, state officers presented McKinney, a bookseller, with a letter in17
forming him of the decree of obscenity against certain magazines.'
Subsequently, the officers returned to the bookstore and purchased a
magazine which had been listed in both the court decree and the
letter. McKinney was charged with the sale of obscene mailable
matter. 174
At trial, he argued that he was entitled to a trial by jury on the
issue of obscenity, but the court refused, allowing only trial on the
issue of the sale of the magazine. 175 McKinney was convicted, and
the conviction was upheld by the Alabama supreme court on the
ground that the civil decree of obscenity was in rem and thus binding
on him in a later criminal prosecution despite the fact that "he had
76
not been a party to the earlier equity proceeding."'1
In the United States Supreme Court, McKinney argued that the
trial court's refusal to allow him an opportunity to demonstrate the
nonobscenity of the materials violated his first and fourteenth
amendment rights. 17 7 The Court agreed with McKinney, reversing
the conviction on both grounds. 1 78 First, the Court noted that the
procedures di not. display " 'the necessary sensitivity to freedom of
expression.' "179 Secondly, the Court, apparently using a due process
rationale, reasoned that lack of notice of the equity proceeding
precluded the defendant from arguing the nonobscenity of the
magazines. 180 Thus, the in rem decree could, in the Court's view, be
1189 (1976).
Id. at 1191-92.
173 Id. at 1192.
174 Id.
171 96 S. Ct.
172

175

Id.

176 Id.

The state supreme court had concluded that the equity proceeding was both

in personam and in rem. McKinney v. State, 292 Ala. 484, 488, 296 So. 2d 228, 231 (1974),
rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 1189 (1976).
177

96 S. Ct. at 1192.

178 Id. at 1192, 1194.
179Id. at 1193 (quoting from Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)).
180 96 S. Ct. at 1193. The Court noted that McKinney had not been informed of the
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analogized to a unilateral, nonreviewable "ex parte determination of a
state censorship authority," which determination would be unconstitutional. 181
Discounting the state's argument that the equity proceeding was
adversary and thus comported with the mandates of Freedman v.
Maryland and Heller v. New York, the Court pointed out that McKinney had not been a party to or in privity with the named parties
in the equity proceeding, and thus the judgment could not bind
him. 182 The Court vacated the conviction, holding that a criminal
conviction on the basis of a finding of obscenity "in a civil proceeding
to which [the defendant] was not a party and of which he had no
notice" was procedurally inadequate "where First Amendment in83
terests are at stake."'
One argument glossed over by the McKinney Court was the
state's contention that judgments of obscenity are in rem and thus
conclusive against the world. Even assuming that McKinney, read
narrowly, only precludes the use of a civil judgment of obscenity
against a different defendant in a subsequent criminal proceeding, the
in rem argument is equally inappropriate where the state seeks to
apply a civil judgment of obscenity against a nonparty defendant in a
subsequent civil proceeding.
This is because a judgment in rem is a determination against
some person or object or is an adjudication of that person's or object's
status, the effect of which is to bind all persons who have an interest
in the proceedings.1 84 The in rem proceeding, a creature of Roman
law, is "one of convenience and of necessity" established in order to
equity proceeding nor had he been given an opportunity to be heard. In addition, the
state did not make "available to him any judicial avenue for initiating a challenge to the
... declaration as to . . . obscenity." Id. The Court further noted that at the time of the
equity proceeding McKinney may not have been in possession of any of the magazines
subsequently declared obscene. Id. at 1193 n.3.
18,
Id. at 1193.
182

Id. at 119.3-94.
Id. at 1194. The Court did not unqualifiedly reject the validity of the in rem
argument but rather focused on the failure to afford McKinney notice and on the lack of
identity of interests between the parties named in the equity proceeding and McKinney. Id. at 1193.
184 3 FREEMAN, supra note 140, § 1517, at 3111. Freeman distinguishes a proceeding in rem from one in personam in this way:
[A] proceeding purely in personam is not intended or calculated to affect the
rights or relations of strangers with respect to the subject matter of the litigation, differing in this respect from a proceeding in rem which is designed and
intended to dispose of or produce a legal effect upon the subject matter which
will be final as to all persons having or claiming an interest therein.
Id. § 1520, at 3116. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, at 5-7.
183
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deal with instances where it would be impossible to determine the
individuals against whose property the proceeding is directed. 185 The
theory is that the seizure of the property will make the persons with
an interest in the property "attentive"-that is, seizure puts these
individuals on notice so that they may assert their claims.'"" Thus, in
an in rem proceeding, a court normally takes custody of the property
in dispute. This seizure acts as one form of notice to all interested
parties that they may assert their rights in the forthcoming legal proceeding; a litigant who fails to assert his interests will, nonetheless,
87
be bound by the outcome. 1
While in the context of an obscenity proceeding allegedly obscene materials which are in the custody of the court may be considered as having their status affected by the judgment, seizure of
one defendant's allegedly obscene materials would not constitute
notice to any other potential defendants possessing identical materials. The Restatement of Judgments concludes that in any in rem proceeding where a right in property or a status is determined,
[a] judgment . . . is void, unless a method of notification was em-

ployed which was reasonably calculated to give [this defendant]
knowledge of the attempted exercise of jurisdiction and an op-

portunity to be heard. 188
Even if the proceeding could be designed to afford notice to all interested parties, such a proceeding is still not properly one in rem
because many parties would not have an interest in the litigation until
after it has concluded. For example, if film A is the subject of the
litigation, many exhibitors not aware of or not in possession of film A
at that point in time would have no interest in any proceeding against
film A. They might, however, at some later date obtain a copy of the
film for intended exhibition. To hold that they are bound by the outcome of a litigation in which they had no interest and of which they
had no notice or opportunity to be heard would be a violation of due
process.
Clearly, the denominating of an obscenity proceeding as one in
rem is analytically unsound.'18 9 To conclude that because an obscenity
3 FREEMAN, supra note 140, § 1517, at 3111.
Id. Thus a proceeding is not in rein unless the court attempts through reasonable
means to give notice to all parties who may be interested in the property at issue so that
they may appear in court to protect their interests. Id. § 1520, at 3116.
187 Id. §§ 1517, 1524, at 3111, 3130.
188 RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 33, comment b at 134. Compare id. with id.
§ 32, commentf at 130-31.
189 Ironically, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire rejected a defendant's
185
186
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proceeding determines a status it is in rein is to mistake form for
function. Moreover, judicial economy, the raison d'etre of in rem proceedings, is of diminished importance where sensitive first amendment rights are endangered.
If then, the in rem analysis is unsound, it is necessary to rely on
the previously discussed principles of estoppel to ascertain when the
state or a defendant may assert an estoppel in a subsequent proceeding. Before setting out the analysis, it must be noted that underlying
the following discussion are the assumptions that a decision on the
obscenity vel non of the materials was actually rendered in the first
proceeding 19° and that the materials which are the subject of the second proceeding are identical, 9 ' unedited copies of the materials
upon which the judgment was issued in the first proceeding. It is also
assumed that the subsequent litigation occurs within the same "relevant community" as did the first proceeding.1 92
The hypotheticals posed in this section are intended to demonstrate a theoretical structure which may serve as a guideline in a case
argument that a determination of nonobscenity against a prior defendant was in rem.
State v. Hentschel, 98 N.H. 382, 101 A.2d 456 (1953). The court concluded that the statute under which the defendant was charged was intended to punish individuals and was
not intended to provide for forfeiture of obscene matter, and thus the criminal action
was in personam, not in rem. Id. at 457-58. But see Hirsch & Ryan, supra note 29, at
76-77, where the authors conclude that an obscenity proceeding is both in rem and in
personam.
190 See United States v. International Building Co., 345 U.S. 502, 504-06 (1953);
Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 578-79 (1948); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94
U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876); Hirsch & Ryan, supra note 29, at 74.
19'RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 68(2), at 293. See Williams v. Liberty, 461 F.2d
325 (7th Cir. 1972), where the court acknowledged that an estoppel might otherwise be
appropriate but reversed the district court's acceptance of defendants' plea of collateral
estoppel because the trial judge failed to determine if the same issues actually had been
adjudicated in the prior action. Id.at 327. See also United States v. Cantrell, 62 F.R.D.
96, 97 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (defendant's state conviction on gambling offense insufficient to
establish facts necessary for civil tax assessment by federal government).
192 In McKinney the Court had indicated
that obscenity must be determined by applying "contemporary community
standards" and that a State may adopt a "state" rather than a "national" community standard. . . . When a State adopts such a "state" or "national" community standard, a civil proceeding brought in one part of the State could
constitutionally be employed as a conclusive determination anywhere in the
State with respect to an accused who was a party to that proceeding ...
However, a State might adopt the standard of a smaller community-for example, a city-wide community; it could not then make it a crime to disseminate
material judically determined to be obscene in a civil proceeding in which the
accused participated, unless the civil proceeding also transpired in the same
"community" as the criminal proceeding.
96 S.Ct. at 1201 n.6 (citations omitted).
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in which all the requisite elements are present. However, it is clear
that the virtually unlimited supply of films, books, photographs, and
magazines allows distributors and exhibitors to avoid the necessity of
dealing in items which are identical with those that have been judicially determined to be obscene. The following chart illustrates the
various combinations of parties, judgments, and intended uses of
judgments in a subsequent proceeding.
Party involved
in second
proceeding

No.

Nature of
first
proceeding

Nature of
second
proceeding

Is estoppel
permitted?

GOVERNMENT PREVAILS OVER DEFENDANT A
IN FIRST PROCEEDING AND ASSERTS ESTOPPEL
AGAINST DEFENDANT IN SECOND PROCEEDING

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant

A

Civil
Civil
Criminal
Criminal
Civil
Civil
Criminal
Criminal

A
A

A
B
B

B
B

Civil
Criminal
Civil
Criminal
Civil
Criminal
Civil
Criminal

Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No

DEFENDANT A PREVAILS AGAINST GOVERNMENT IN
FIRST PROCEEDING AND PARTY IN SECOND PROCEEDING
ASSERTS ESTOPPEL AGAINST GOVERNMENT

1

1

9
10
11
12

Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant

A
A
A
A

Civil
Civil
Criminal
Criminal

Civil
Criminal
Civil
Criminal

Yes
Yes
No
Yes

13
14
15
16

Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant

B

Civil
Civil
Criminal
Criminal

Civil
Criminal
Civil
Criminal

Yes
Yes
No
Yes

B
B
B

In the chart, defendant A symbolizes an individual who was a
party in a civil or criminal proceeding against a particular piece of
allegedly obscene matter and who is now a party in a new civil or
criminal proceeding against identical material. Defendant B symbolizes an individual who is a party in a new civil or criminal proceeding regarding material identical to that which was a subject of a prior
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civil or criminal proceeding and who was not a party in that proceeding. Thus, for example, in hypothetical (1), the state has won a judgment of obscenity in a prior civil proceeding and wishes to estop the
same individual from challenging the obscenity vel non of the material in a subsequent civil proceeding. The estoppel should be permitted, even under pre-Bernhard common law, because there is
mutuality and identity of factual issues.' 93 Further, the standard of
proof in each proceeding would be a preponderance of the evidence.
In hypothetical (2), the state should not be permitted to raise an
estoppel because the standard of proof in the second proceeding is
beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas in the first proceeding it was a
mere preponderance. Since all elements of an offense must be proved
195
beyond a reasonable doubt,' 94 there can be no estoppel here.
1s3

See notes 145-46 supra and accompanying text.

194 The United States Supreme Court has determined that the "beyond a reasonable

doubt" standard is constitutionally mandated in a criminal case. In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 361-63 (1970); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); Holland v. United
States, 348 U.S. 121, 138 (1954); Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881). In
Winship, Justice Brennan stated that
[t]he requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation. The
"demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently
expressed from ancient times, [though] its crystallization into the formula
'beyond a reasonable doubt' seems to have occurred as late as 1798... "
Expressions in many opinions of this Court indicate that it has long been
assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required.
397 U.S. at 361-62 (citation omitted). Furthermore, the government must meet this
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt for every element of the offense charged. Id. at
364; accord, Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 493 (1895); Piano v. State, 161 Ala.
88, 93, 49 So. 803, 805 (1909).
195 96 S. Ct. at 1199 (Brennan, J., concurring). This conclusion was also reached by
Chief Justice Heflin in his dissent in McKinney v. States, 292 Ala. 484, 489, 296 So. 2d
228, 232 (1974), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 1189 (1976). He reasoned that the Alabama statutes,
which allowed a civil judgment to be conclusive of one element of a criminal offense,
deprived the defendant of his right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 292
Ala. at 489-90, 296 So. 2d at 232-33. The weight of authority supports this position. See,
e.g., 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 654, at 391-92 (13th ed. C. Torcia 1973),
where the author states:
A judgment rendered in a civil case is not admissible in a criminal prosecution .... However, where the judgment is offered to prove a collateral fact
in the case, and not to show guilt or innocence, it may be allowed in evidence.
(Footnotes omitted.) See also Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L.
REV. 818, 878 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
Justice Brennan has stated that a civil judgment of obscenity could be used against
the same defendant in a subsequent criminal prosecution if the defendant had participated in the civil proceeding "and the standard of proof in the civil proceeding was
"beyond a reasonable doubt." McKinney v. Alabama, 96 S. Ct. 1189, 1200 n.5 (1976)
(concurring opinion). Justice Brennan, however, would allow the defendant to argue
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Another reason to preclude the estoppel is that in the civil proceeding, defendant A may have been compelled to testify, and thus a
judgment based in part on compelled testimony would be unconsti96
tutional if applied as binding in a criminal proceeding. 1
In hypothetical (3), an estoppel is appropriate because there is
mutuality and identity of factual issues. Furthermore, the standard of
proof in the first proceeding was higher than that required in the
second and thus the defendant is not prejudiced in any way.' 9 7
In hypothetical (4), an estoppel is probably inappropriate. Here,
the issue is whether the requirement of proving every element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt is satisfied where this proof has
been made in a prior criminal proceeding against the same defendant.' 98 Estoppel, as previously noted, derives from public policies
based on numerous factors present in the civil context. Since in the
criminal context many different factors come into play, sensitivity to a
defendant's due process rights militates against the wholesale importation of estoppel principles into the criminal sphere, at least in those
instances where to do so would prejudice a defendant.1 99
that the community standards had changed between the first and second proceedings,
and if the defendant made such a showing, the Justice would require the state to again
prove the obscenity of the materials. Id. at 1200-01.
Another very important problem in the state's attempt to apply a civil judgment as
dispositive of an element of a criminal offense is that it may result in depriving a defendant of his sixth amendment right to a jury trial. Thus where the penalty for a criminal offense is a year or more, failure to have the issue of obscenity tried by a jury is
unconstitutional. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970); see McKinney v.
Aladbmar, supra at 1200 (Brennan, j., concurring); McKinney v. State, supra at 489, 296
So. 2d at 232-33 (dissenting opinion); Helms v. State, 35 Ala. App. 187, 187-88, 45 So.
2d 170, 171, cert. denied, 253 Ala. 467, 45 So. 2d 171 (1950); Vestal, supra note 170, at
53-54, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 521-24 (1969).
196 Helms v. State, 35 Ala. App. 187, 188, 45 So. 2d 170, 171, cert. denied, 253 Ala.
467, 45 So. 2d 171 (1950).
197 See Local 167, Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1934); United
States v. Frank, 494 F.2d 145, 160 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 828 (1974); Willard
v. United States, 422 F.2d 810, 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 913 (1970); Breeland
v. Security Ins. Co., 421 F.2d 918, 921-22 (5th Cir. 1969); Bressan Export-Import Co. v.
Conlew, 346 F. Supp. 683, 685 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Moore, 306 F. Supp. 1088, 1094-95 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Developments, supra note 195, at
878-80. See generally Cowen, The Admissibility of Criminal Convictions in Subsequent
Civil Proceedings,40 CALIF. L. REV. 225 (1952).
198 See United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466, 468 (3d Cir. 1943) (dictum);
United States v. Carlisi, 32 F. Stipp. 479, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 1940). See also Hirsch & Ryan,
supra note 29, at 79-80; Developments, supra note 195, at 875-76. But cf. PenaCabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. RangelPerez, 179 F. Supp, 619, 626 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (estoppel appropriate in subsequent
alienage proceeding as necessary to deter illegal entries into United States).
199 The Supreme Court has acknowledged the appropriateness of applying estoppel
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In hypotheticals (5), (6), (7), and (8), an estoppel is inappropriate
under the theory of McKinney, BeaU, and Humphreys. In all these
instances, the state would be using the prior judgment against defendants who were not a party to the first proceeding, and thus to allow
200
an estoppel would deprive these defendants of due process.
Hypotheticals (9) through (12) illustrate instances in which a defendant who has won a judgment of nonobscenity as to certain materials is seeking to estop the state from relitigating that question
against identical materials in a new civil or criminal action. In
hypothetical (9), the elements of mutuality and identity of factual issues create a situation where an estoppel is warranted. These same
elements exist in hypotheticals (10) and (12). The fact that in these
latter cases the estoppel would issue in a criminal context does not
lessen its validity, because such estoppel would aid, rather than prejudice, the defendant. Further, in example (10), the state in the first
proceeding had been unable to prove obscenity even by a preponderance of the evidence. Hence, it would be illogical to expect the state
to prove obscenity in the second proceeding where the standard of
proof is higher-beyond a reasonable doubt. In hypothetical (11),
there are mutuality and the identity of factual issues; however, the
defendant should not be allowed to assert an estoppel. Although he
principles in criminal proceedings. In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), the Court
held that collateral estoppel was embraced by the fifth amendment proscription
'against double jeopardy" and binding on the states by virtue of Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969). 397 U.S. at 442, 445. The Court emphasized, however, that the rule
must be applied "with realism and rationality." Id. at 444. Such an approach requires
courts to
"tak[e] into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon
an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration."
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting from Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and
Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1960)). See also Dranow v. United
States, 307 F.2d 545, 556-57 (8th Cir. 1962).
200 See text accompanying notes 154-83 supra. See also Hirsch & Ryan, supra note
29, at 79, where the authors conclude that if res judicata and collateral estoppel were
operative in a vacuum of pure theory, independent of other considerations, the
foregoing would seem to permit the prosecution's utilization of these concepts
in subsequent proceedings. However, to permit such affirmative use of the
concepts by the prosecution would affront one of the fundamental guarantees
of the Bill of Rights-the right of confrontation.
. . . The ultimate effect of such application would be to confront the defense with the core of the prosecutor's case, in documentary form with no
provision for cross-examination or confrontation. Such procedures were early
condemned indeed, were deemed of primary importance in the enactment of
the Sixth Amendment.
(Footnotes omitted.)
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has won a judgment of nonobscenity in this first trial, such judgment
was rendered where the standard of proof was beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus, it is conceivable that the state could make its case in the
context of a civil proceeding where the standard of proof is a lesser
one.201

Hypotheticals (13) through (16) illustrate cases where a defendant
not a party in the first proceeding tries, in a new civil or criminal
action, to take advantage of a judgment of nonobscenity won by a
prior defendant in a case involving identical materials. In hypotheticals (13), (14), and (16), an estoppel is appropriate under the principles of Bernhard and its progeny. The state having had a "full and fair
opportunity" to present its case in the first proceeding should be
bound by an adverse judgment. 20 2 Hypothetical (15), however, like
hypothetical (12), presents circumstances which should preclude the
defendant from asserting an estoppel in that the state may be able to
prove its case in the subsequent proceeding where the standard of
proof is reduced.
Having charted the major factors that determine the appropriateness of permitting an estoppel, it is necessary to consider additional factors that may, in limited circumstances, militate against
allowing a party to assert an otherwise warranted estoppel. One factor
is the Miller mandate that determinations of obscenity vel non be
based on community standards. 20 3 Since community standards are
See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938) (standard of proof in civil
and crimina! cases is different and thus application of res judicata is barred); Stone v.
United States, 167 U.S. 178, 188 (1897); United States v. Alcatex, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 129,
133-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
202 See notes 151-70 supra and accompanying text. See also Hirsch & Ryan, supra
note 29, at 78. But see Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 907, 383 P.2d 152, 156, 31
Cal. Rptr. 800, 804 (1963); People v. Seltzer, 25 Cal. App. 3d supp. 52, 54-57, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 260, 262-64 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1972).
The principal arguments against allowing a defendant not party to the original obscenity proceeding to estop the state in a subsequent proceeding when the state had
previously lost are that the court would be interfering with the enforcement of the obscenity laws, that the policy reason behind res judicata-preventing harassment of a
defendant-would not be served, and that anomalous results would be produced. People v. Seltzer, supra at supp. 56-57, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
These objections, however, do not seem compelling. First, there is another aspect
of res judicata and collateral estoppel-economy of litigation-which would be served.
Second, although a subsequent proceeding against a new defendant is not harrassment
of that defendant, it may be viewed as a continuing attempt to suppress a particular
work in that the prosecutor seems unwilling to accept the determination of the jury or
judges who found the material nonobscene in the first proceeding. For a response to the
contention that estoppels produce anomalies see p. 587 infra.
203 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
201
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normally dynamic, time may bring about a change in what a given
community may find acceptable.
In such cases, the imposition of an estoppel may frustrate attempts by a community to have the distribution or exhibition of materials reflect the currently prevailing community attitudes on patent
offensiveness, prurient interest, and, perhaps, serious artistic, scientific, or literary value. 20 4 In these instances, an estoppel should not
be permitted as long as certain conditions are met.
First, no determination of changed community standards should
be made ex parte. Second, the burden of proving a shift in standards
should be on the party alleging it. Third, where it is the state
asserting a shift in standards, some period of time-three or four
years, for example-should have passed since the obscenity vel non of
the material was last contested. This will prevent the state from
frivolously opposing a defendant's legitimate plea of estoppel. However, where a defendant, in arguing changed community standards,
opposes an estoppel being pleaded against him, first amendment considerations dictate that no minimum time need have elapsed between
the prior proceeding and the present one, and thus his claim of
changed standards should be entertained. 205
There are, however, other arguments against allowing defendants
to take advantage of determinations of nonobscenity won by prior defendants in another cause of action. One argument is that a lower
civil court's determination may bind the entire relevant community.
Although this would appear true, the state always may appeal the
judgment; thus a final resolution may be obtained from an intermediate appellate court or, perhaps, from the state's highest court.
Even where a state has lost in a criminal proceeding and is precluded
204 It is uncertain as to whether the "serious value" prong of the Miller test is to be
judged by local or national standards. The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 169 (1973).
205 Justice Brennan in McKinney has suggested that a defendant with knowledge
of a civil determination of obscenity in which he was a party be allowed to argue in a
criminal proceeding that the obscenity of the materials must be proven again because
community standards have changed. 96 S. Ct. at 1200-01 (concurring opinion). Such an
approach seems appropriate regardless of whether the first proceeding was civil or criminal.
The approach also seems valid when the objection to the estoppel is made by the
state because the community standards mandate was designed to give the states greater
control over obscenity. To allow an estoppel permanently to foreclose the state even
when standards have become more conservative would render the state powerless to
make distribution or exhibition subject to contemporary values. Cf. Hirsch & Ryan,
supra note 29, at 78. Of course, there are always minimum constitutional standards
which may not be violated. See note 9 supra.
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by double jeopardy from relitigating the issue against the same defendant on the same charge, it may, if provided for by statute, move
against the defendant in a civil proceeding and ultimately get a determination by an appellate court.
A less convincing argument against allowing the plea of estoppel
is that to allow a subsequent defendant's victory to foreclose the state
from relitigating the issue of the obscenity of identical items in future
cases would create an anomalous situation. There might be one or
more defendants who have been fined, imprisoned, or enjoined from
exhibiting or distributing the same film, books, magazines, etc., which
may now be freely dispensed or exhibited by anyone. Yet, such anomalies may be justified on a number of grounds. First, a finding of nonobscenity after one or more previous findings of obscenity may be
viewed as a reflection of changed community standards such that the
issue need not be litigated again. Second, to reject the plea of estoppel
may create far more anomalies as verdicts conflict from case to case. At
least with a consistent application of an estoppel, the issue, absent a
shift in community standards, is finally resolved, and the anomalies
exist only as to past defendants. These individuals may always be released from jail by the state where imprisonment was the penalty imposed, or if released at the end of their sentence, may now, in any
event, exhibit or distribute the item in question. Furthermore, the
fact that present determinations are inconsistent with the sanctions
imposed on past defendants may also be justified on the ground that
the prior defendants committed their acts during a period of more
restrictive community standards-thus, they bore the risk of their
actions.
CONCLUSION

This article has focused on the problems of restraints of expression and has sought to provide guidelines for minimizing these restraints without rendering governmental attempts to regulate obscenity futile. Accepting the Burger Court's granting to the states and the
federal government ample latitude to move legally against purveyors
and exhibitors of obscene materials, it is nonetheless crucial that the
procedures employed be carefully scrutinized and limited so as not to
impinge on first amendment rights. It must be remembered that in
the area of obscenity regulation, the cure is almost always more
dangerous than the disease.

